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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 16, 1992, after a comprehensive review of its system of
proxy regulation and after two separate amendment proposals that
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1985, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Donald Langevoort, Roberta Romano, Steve Thel, Bill
Treanor, and my mother for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this Article and to Mau-
reen Martin, Fordham Law School Class of 1993, for her research assistance.
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drew more than 1700 letters of comment from the public,1 the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or the "SEC") voted
to reform the federal proxy rules. The reforms were "intended to facili-
tate shareholder communications and to enhance informed proxy vot-
ing, and to reduce the cost of compliance with the proxy rules for all
persons engaged in a proxy solicitation. '2 The SEC explained the
amendments by stating that the rules were "impeding shareholder com-
munication and participation in the corporate governance process" and
were "run[ning] exactly contrary to the best interests of shareholders. '3
SEC Chairman Richard Breeden further described the amendments as
effectuating the shareholder's constitutional right to free speech.4
The October 1992 amendments are but the latest in a series of
changes to proxy rules that began in 1935 as a simple list of disclosure
requirements.' Since that time, the federal proxy rules have generated
frequent criticism.' The October 1992 revisions are no exception. From
1. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326,
1992 SEC LEXIS 2470, *7 (Oct. 16, 1992) ("Proxy Rule Release").
2. Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 30,849,
1992 SEC LEXIS 1296, *1 (June 24, 1992).
3. Proxy Rule Release, 1992 SEC LEXIS at *8 (cited in note 1).
4. Adoption of Proxy Rule Revisions Likely Without Significant Change, Breeden Says, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1023 (July 10, 1992) (quoting the speech delivered by SEC Chairman
Richard Breeden to the Annual Conference of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries on
June 30, 1992).
5. The SEC's first proxy rules were adopted in 1935. See Exchange Act Release No. 378, 1935
SEC LEXIS 378 (Sept. 24, 1935). Subsequent amendments are too numerous to recount. For a
detailed history of the federal proxy rules, see Staff of the SEC Div. of Corporation Finance, Re-
port on Corporate Accountability, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to
Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 425 (1984) (focusing on the history of SEC
Rule 14a-8).
6. Recent scholarship includes Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at
Proxy Contests, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1071; Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case
for Proxy Reform, 17 J. Corp. L. 49 (1991); Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy
Revisited, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 37 (1990); George W. Dent, Jr., Proxy Regulation in Search of a
Purpose: A Reply to Professor Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 815 (1989); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8,
Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 97 (1988); George
W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (1985);
Liebeler, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 425 (cited in note 5); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & Econ. 395 (1983); Henry G. Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals
Viewed by an Opponent, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 481 (1972); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Cor-
porate Proxy Machinery, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 (1970).
Commentators have criticized the proxy rules since their inception; a sampling of early com-
mentary evaluating and criticizing the rules includes David C. Bayne and Frank D. Emerson, The
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation Proxy Contest: A Case-Study of the SEC's New Rule
240.14a-11 and Schedule 14B, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 801 (1957); David C. Bayne, et al., Proxy Regula-
tion and the Rule-Making Process: The 1954 Amendments, 40 Va. L. Rev. 387 (1954); Frank D.
Emerson and Franklin C. Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulations: Steps Toward More Effective Stock-
holder Participation, 59 Yale L. J. 635 (1950); Daniel M. Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate
Proxies, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 796 (1950); Sheldon E. Bernstein and Henry G. Fischer, The Regulation
of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 226
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the outset of the three-year process that resulted in the adoption of
these reforms, the business and legal communities have criticized the
changes effectuated by the amendments as, alternatively, going too far
and replacing a system that was working properly; not going far enough
and frustrating the exercise of shareholder democracy; and embodying
principles of political compromise rather than a cohesive vision of cor-
porate governance. 7
Whatever the ultimate business response to the latest SEC attempt
to improve its proxy rules, the 1992 revisions cannot be seen as the final
step in the reform process.8 The amendments neglect areas of substan-
tial concern to investors and commentators; even the proposing releases
acknowledge the need for further review and action. What explains this
difficulty in articulating a set of standards for proxy regulation? Why,
in this area, is the Commission repeatedly buffeted back and forth be-
tween various players in the corporate governance arena but apparently
adrift from any predetermined course of its own?
The answer stems from the SEC's troubled mandate to exercise its
rulemaking powers in connection with the solicitation of proxies. The
statutory language and legislative history are ambiguous as to whether
the SEC is authorized to enact rules with a substantive effect on corpo-
rate governance or simply to implement disclosure requirements. This
ambiguity, together with the SEC's reluctance to take a position on the
(1940); Arthur H. Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations: Effect on Ability of Corpora-
tion to Hold Valid Meeting, 24 Cornell L. Q. 483 (1939).
Members of the business community as well as scholars have objected to the operation of the
rules. See, for example, Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187 (1991); Nell Minow,
Proxy Reform: The Case for Increased Shareholder Communication, 17 J. Corp. L. 149 (1991);
Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 197 (1991).
Recently several institutional investors communicated their concerns about the rules to the SEC.
See Letter from Richard H. Koppes, CalPERS General Counsel, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance, SEC (Nov. 3, 1989), reprinted in Institutional Investors: Passive
Fiduciaries to Activist Owners 454 (Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series Number 704, 1990); Letter from United Shareholders' Association to Edward H.
Fleischman, Commissioner, SEC (Mar. 20, 1990).
7. See, for example, SEC Adopts Proxy Reform Package After Long Study, Intense Debate,
19 Pension Reporter (BNA) 1799 (Oct. 19, 1992) (describing industry reactions to the amend-
ments); Shareholder Communication Proposals Produce Second Tidal Wave of Comments, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1516 (Sept. 25, 1992) (describing the reaction by various industry
groups to the second amendment proposal).
8. The Council of Institutional Investors has already announced its intention to request the
SEC to review the shareholder proposal rules and to change its regulations to purely procedural
requirements, such as limiting the number of proposals. Institutional Investors To Ask SEC To
Look at Shareholder Proposal Rule, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1743 (Nov. 13, 1992). This
approach has been endorsed by one influential commentator. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Blocking
Bias via Proxy, Wall St. J. at A14 (Feb. 2, 1991) (criticizing SEC interference with the ability of
shareholders to impose normative restrictions on their corporations' activities).
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limitations of its mandate, has led to experimental rulemaking in a vac-
uum. The SEC has failed to articulate its own theory of the proper role
of shareholder participation in corporate governance, presumably be-
cause of uncertainty as to the agency's right to formulate such a theory.
Accordingly, the history of the SEC's rulemaking has reflected political
compromise between the pressures of various interest groups. The fre-
quent amendments to the proxy rules further demonstrate the inability
of the SEC, based on its lack of standards, to judge the success of the
structure it has developed.
This Article argues that, before the proxy rules are once again eval-
uated, criticized, and ultimately amended, the SEC's role in regulating
proxy solicitation should be reexamined. After reviewing the dual sys-
tem under which shareholder voting is regulated, which includes both
the federal proxy rules and state corporation law, the Article focuses on
shareholder access to the proxy. It demonstrates that the SEC has,
through its rulemaking, fashioned a federal common law of access to the
voting mechanism. The Article inquires into the operation and implica-
tions of the SEC's standards, as well as the legitimacy of their claimed
origins in state law.
The Article then questions whether the existing regulatory struc-
ture is consistent with the SEC's authorization to regulate the solicita-
tion of proxies." Because the language of Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") contains little guidance as
to the nature of the SEC's mandate,10 this Article examines the extent
to which the legislative history of that statute dictates the appropriate
role for the SEC in affecting substantive issues of corporate governance
through the regulation of proxy voting.
The Article concludes that the legislative history of Section 14(a) -is
ambiguous, and that the statute can be read to support either the the-
ory that Congress intended to limit the SEC's authority to compel dis-
closure or the theory that Congress intended a broader mandate.
Congressional consideration of the abuses to which the federal securi-
ties laws were addressed, however, reveals a strong objective to protect
shareholders from practices by corporate insiders that limit the effec-
9. This is fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation as to the scope and nature of
the SEC's rulemaking authority under § 14(a). Recent developments in the theory of statutory
interpretation inform this analysis. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1992) (describing the
resurgence of theoretical approaches to statutory interpretation and explaining the dominant
theories).
10. Thus, a textual approach is of limited value. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History
and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76
Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1296-97 (1990) (describing the textualist approach). Compare notes 244-60, 275-
79 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of statutory text).
1132 [Vol. 46:1129
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tiveness of shareholder voting.1 This Article contends that as early as
1934, Congress intended federal proxy regulation to respond to its con-
cern that shareholder control over corporate governance was weakening.
This congressional objective should set the standard for evaluating the
SEC's proxy rules.
Using this standard, the final Part of this Article evaluates the ef-
fect of the SEC's rules on shareholder participation in corporate gov-
ernance and the broader effect that the exercise of the Commission's
regulatory authority has had on the development of state law under the
dual regulatory systems. Although critics have questioned whether
shareholder voting actually can operate effectively-to choose efficient
governance structures, to select competent management, and to effect
value-maximizing decisions' 2-the Article argues that shareholder vot-
11. Voting is one of the few ways in which shareholders can control the conduct of the man-
agers who run the corporation on their behalf. Other monitoring mechanisms include the deriva-
tive suit, in which a shareholder brings suit on behalf of the corporation to challenge conduct that
has injured it, and the securities market, whereby a shareholder dissatisfied by management's con-
duct may sell his or her stock. Derivative suits seek to penalize wrongdoing directly by imposing
liability on managers who breach their duties to the corporation. The markets discipline managers
indirectly by causing the stock price of a poorly managed corporation to decline in value. Many
commentators believe that the market for corporate control also functions as a means of monitor-
ing management by allowing the replacement of unsatisfactory management. See Jill E. Fisch,
Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Polit-
ical Expenditures, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 587, 637 n.260 (1991) (describing the division in the
academic community over the effectiveness of the market for corporate control).
12. Many commentators have argued that current corporate governance structures do not
operate properly to encourage efficient corporate decisionmaking and the protection of shareholder
interests. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 526-29
(1990) (summarizing the explanations for shareholder passivity). Commentators often attribute
this failure to collective action problems, which prevent voting from serving as an effective tool for
monitoring and controlling corporate management. See, for example, Daniel R. Fischel, Organized
Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 136 (1987)
(stating that "[i]n most cases, the collective action problem faced by dispersed shareholders ren-
ders voting relatively ineffective as a monitoring mechanism"); Voting Rights Listing Stan-
dards-Proposed Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 24,623, 38 SEC Docket 917
(June 22, 1987) (recognizing that the "collective action" limitations on shareholder voting make
voting an ineffective tool for shareholders to resist management proposals).
The developing participation of institutional investors offers a potential solution to the collec-
tive action problem. For investors with large holdings, the cost/benefit analysis of participation in
corporate governance is more favorable. Recent evidence suggests that institutional investors are
no longer entirely passive and are making greater use of, among other things, the proxy machinery.
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 811, 814 (1992); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring:
The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 895, 926-27 (1992). The actions of CalPERS and the
United Shareholders' Association in proposing revisions to the proxy rules are indicative of this
development. See Part V of this Article. If it is true that institutional investors have the incentives
and ability to intervene in corporate governance, legal rules that interfere with that participation
justifiably may be attacked as imposing real restrictions on the process. But compare Lipton and
Rosenblum, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 205-13 (cited in note 6) (criticizing the short-term orientation of
institutional investors).
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ing has been prevented from working properly. 13 Indeed, the SEC has
affirmatively impeded the effectiveness of the shareholder voting pro-
cess both through its adoption of rules that interfere with shareholder
democracy and through its failure to adopt rules to address deficiencies
in the process. Both shortcomings render the proxy rules inconsistent
with the SEC's mandate. The Article concludes that under a dynamic
view of statutory interpretation, 4 the SEC has both the authority and
the obligation to promulgate rules that enhance the effectiveness of the
shareholder voting process.
II. STATE CORPORATION LAW AND THE REGULATION OF VOTING
The primary rules governing shareholder voting are supplied by
state corporation law.15 State law requires that corporations be man-
aged by a board of directors' 6 and that the directors be elected by the
shareholders.' 7 State law also determines which issues, in addition to
board election, require shareholder approval'8 and specifies the proce-
dures governing the voting process.'" Specifically, state law generally re-
quires corporations to hold an annual shareholders meeting at which
shareholders elect the directors.20 At common law, it was necessary for
shareholders to attend the annual meeting personally in order to exer-
cise their voting rights. The development of large, widely held corpora-
tions rendered this requirement problematic and led to the
development of the proxy voting process.2'
13. For a broader look at rules that affect effective shareholder voting, see Black, 89 Mich. L.
Rev. 520 (cited in note 12).
14. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479
(1987) (developing a model of dynamic statutory interpretation).
15. See generally Edward Ross Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corpo-
rate Control (Columbia U., 2d ed. 1968) (summarizing state law governing voting and conduct of
annual meetings).
16. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 141 (Michie, 1991) (providing that corporations
shall be managed "by or under the direction of a board of directors").
17. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 211(b) (Michie, 1991) (providing for an annual
meeting of stockholders to elect the directors).
18. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 242 (Michie, 1991) (requiring a shareholder vote to
amend the charter); 8 Del, Code Ann. § 251 (Michie, 1991 & Supp. 1992) (requiring a shareholder
vote to approve a merger); 8 Del. Code Ann. § 275 (Michie, 1991) (requiring a shareholder vote for
liquidation).
19. These procedures include the concepts of a record date and a quorum, as well as the
principle that a shareholder's voting rights are determined by the number of shares held. See, for
example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 212(a) (Michie, 1991) (granting shareholders one vote per share un-
less the charter provides to the contrary); 8 Del. Code Ann. § 213 (Michie, 1991) (authorizing the
board of directors to fix the record date); 8 Del. Code Ann. § 216 (Michie, 1991) (stating quorum
requirements).
20. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 211(b) (Michie, 1991).
21. For a description of the historical development of proxy voting, see Leonard H. Axe,
Corporate Proxies, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 38 (1942).
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The proxy process allows a shareholder to vote without being phys-
ically present at the annual meeting. Proxy voting is governed by
agency principles that permit a shareholder to authorize another person
to vote on his or her behalf.22 A proxy can either give the shareholder's
nominee discretionary authority or specify the manner in which the
shares are to be voted. Although state law originally restricted the use
of proxies, 23 their use grew necessary as corporations became unable to
secure sufficient shareholder presence to meet the quorum require-
ments. Eventually, state statutes addressed proxy voting and expressly
protected the right of shareholders to vote by proxy.
24
Under modern practice most shareholders vote by proxy, and per-
sonal attendance at the annual meeting is a rare and primarily symbolic
gesture. Typically, management will distribute to shareholders a form
of proxy that authorizes a corporate official to vote the shareholders'
shares in accordance with their instructions together with the notice of
the annual meeting that is required by state law. This process is gener-
ally used whether or not the election is contested. 5
The main reason corporations solicit proxies is to satisfy the quo-
rum requirement. Under state law, business may not be conducted at
an annual meeting unless holders of a certain percentage of the stock
are present.26 A national corporation may have shareholders spread
over fifty states and abroad, making it impossible for many sharehold-
ers to attend the annual meeting. Without state law provisions that al-
low shareholders to be present "by proxy," it would be difficult for the
corporation to secure the quorum necessary to conduct business. Shares
represented by proxy at the annual meeting are explicitly defined by
statute to satisfy the quorum requirement.17
22. The term proxy, under agency law, refers to the person to whom voting authority is
given. With the advent of federal proxy regulation, the term has come to refer to the written voting
authorization, which may also be called the proxy card. See, for example, Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-4 (1992) (describing the requirements as to the form of proxy). The term has also been
used to refer to the proxy voting mechanism, as in "improving shareholder access to the proxy."
23. See Dean, 24 Cornell L. Q. at 487-88 (cited in note 6) (explaining that no right to vote by
proxy existed at common law; the right of shareholders to vote by proxy was provided by state
corporation acts).
24. See id. (describing early statutory provisions allowing shareholder voting by proxy). An
example of a modern statutory provision is 8 Del. Code Ann. § 212 (Michie, 1991), which expressly
entitles a shareholder to "authorize another person or persons to act for him by proxy" and which
sets out the procedures and conditions for executing a valid proxy.
25. In a contested election, shareholders may receive proxies from two or more competing
slates of candidates and may choose to authorize either the company official or a representative of
a challenger group as their proxy.
26. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 216 (Michie, 1991).
27. See id.
11351993]
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Modern state law permits, but does not require, the use of proxies.
Moreover, under state law, a corporation is not required to provide a
proxy mechanism for shareholders who cannot attend the annual meet-
ing, although a shareholder may make private arrangements to be rep-
resented by proxy. In addition, state law does not specify disclosure
requirements or procedural rules in connection with proxy solicitation
and voting.28
These gaps in state law lead to a further complication. Presence at
the annual meeting carries with it certain common-law rights, such as
the right to nominate a candidate for the board of directors or to pro-
pose resolutions or transactions within the authority of the sharehold-
ers, such as a shareholder resolution or bylaw amendment. These rights
originally were viewed as property rights, based on the status of the
shareholder as partial owner of the corporation and the shareholder's
right to share in the control of this asset. As corporate law developed
prior to the passage of the federal securities laws, courts recognized a
general philosophy of shareholder rights based on ownership.29 These
rights included preemptive rights, requirements of approval, or in some
circumstances, unanimous consent, over certain extraordinary transac-
tions, and inspection rights.30
28. The SEC explained in its 1944 annual report the disclosure requirements that existed
prior to the development of the federal proxy rules:
Prior to the development of the Commission's proxy rules, the average shareholder re-
ceived annually from his company a proxy card in small type which he was urged to sign and
return. Ordinarily, the proxy auth6rized some person or persons to vote the stockholders'
shares to elect a board of directors and to take any other action which was considered desira-
ble. Too frequently the owner of the shares was given no assurance that the items mentioned
in the notice of meeting were the only ones which the management expected to bring up for
consideration at the meeting. The stockholder was merely invited to sign his name and return
his proxy without being furnished the information essential to the intelligent exercise of his
right of franchise.
10 SEC Annual Rep. 51 (1944). See Comment, Regulation of Proxy Solicitation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 33 Nw. U. L. Rev. 914, 916 n.11 (1939) (recognizing that state statu-
tory provisions merely provided for notice of meetings and "did not require adequate disclosure of
the financial condition of the corporation, questions of policy in issue, and details about matters on
which the stockholder must vote").
29. See David C. Bayne, Jr., The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. Detroit L. J. 575,
581-82 (1957) (describing early corporate law based on the conception of the shareholder as
owner).
30. Id. An example was state law regulation of mergers, which, as fundamental changes in
the corporation, were strictly limited under the common law and required unanimous shareholder
approval. See Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises 517 (West, 3d ed. 1983) (stating that at common law, unanimous shareholder approval
was required for extraordinary matters, including mergers, charter amendments, and dissolution).
The requirement that a substantial majority of shareholders, usually three-quarters or two-thirds,
approve a merger persisted until the 1960s in most states. See Lewis D. Solomon, Donald E.
Schwartz, and Jeffrey D. Bauman, Corporations, Law & Policy 943 (West, 2d ed. 1988).
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The role of the shareholder as an owner of the corporation under-
went a dramatic change in the first half of the twentieth century., Al-
though shareholders originally had ultimate authority to control the
corporation, this power was taken from them through a variety of
means, such as disappearance of the common-law right of shareholders
to remove directors at will,32 reduction of the number of transactions
that required unanimous shareholder approval,3 3 increased judicial def-
erence to directors' business judgment and a refusal to permit share-
holder challenges to the exercise of that judgment,34 and a growing view
that shareholders had more or less permanently delegated managerial
power over the corporation 5 and could not exercise such power
directly.36
The reason for this change is not obvious but it may be explained
by the adoption of modern state corporation statutes directing that the
business of the corporation be managed by a board of directors. These
statutes can be interpreted as giving the board of directors unlimited
control over corporate affairs and removing this control from the share-
31. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property 138-41 (CCH, 1932) (describing the weakening of shareholder control over corpo-
rate decisionmaking).
32. See id. at 139-40 (describing the change from the common-law principle that sharehold-
ers had the right to remove directors at will); Bayne, 34 U. Detroit L. J. at 582 (cited in note 29)
(noting the rarity of the "early common law" right of shareholders to remove a director at will).
33. See Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property at 140-41 (describ-
ing the increased discretion given to the board and the evolution away from requiring unanimous
consent of shareholders for many transactions).
34. See, for example, Merrill v. Davis, 225 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1950) (holding that a decision to
litigate is part of corporate powers that are exclusively vested in the board of directors); Leggett v.
Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1960) (same).
35. A leading treatise explained the rule as follows: "Where, as is customary, the manage-
ment and control of the corporation is vested by a statute or the charter, not in the stockholders or
members, but in a board of directors and trustees, their action in regard to the affairs of the
corporation is controlling and exclusive, and the stockholders or members cannot control the di-
rectors or trustees in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by the charter." William M.
Fletcher, 5 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 2104 at 531 (Callaghan,
1952) (emphasis added). See also Saigh ex rel. Anheuser-Busch v. Busch, 396 S.W.2d 9, 16 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965) (noting that "[t]he management and control of the corporation being vested by
statute in the board of directors, as we have pointed out, is not in the stockholders and the action
of the board of directors in regard to the affairs of the corporation is controlling and exclusive and
the stockholders cannot control the directors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by the
statute").
36. See, for example, Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (1880) (striking
down as void a shareholder vote choosing a committee to act with the directors in closing up the
affairs of the corporation because the shareholders had no power to control the corporation this
way and their action would impermissibly restrain the directors from exercising their statutory
duties). See also Saigh, 396 S.W.2d at 16 (stating that "no individual stockholder has the authority
to take over the duties of corporate management").
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holders.3 7 Alternatively, the evolution of the conventional corporation
from a small business in which many of the investors were local and
perhaps active owners to an enterprise owned by a large and widely
dispersed group of investors with an ever-diminishing amount of in-
volvement and control over their property may have prompted a change
in the shareholders' role.38
This development, in particular, diminished the importance of
shareholder voting as a means of supervising the management of the
corporation because it hampered both the ability of shareholders to at-
tend annual meetings and their ability to become informed about cor-
porate affairs in order to exercise their franchise intelligently.3 9
Although proxy voting developed as a means of giving dispersed share-
holders an opportunity to vote, voting by proxy required shareholders
to delegate their voting power to someone else-usually a nominee cho-
sen by management.40 This delegation further limited shareholders' ef-
fective participation in corporate governance.41
The disempowerment of the shareholder may have contributed to
the abuses that predated the stock market crash of 1929. In assessing
the abuses to which federal regulation should be addressed, Congress
identified the ability of corporate insiders to use their power to take
advantage of investors as a primary problem. Some of these practices
became the explicit target of the federal legislation.
37. See Bayne, 34 U. Detroit L. J. at 585 (cited in note 29) (describing corporation statutes
that vest exclusive control in the board of directors).
38. See Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property at 47-64 (cited in
note 31) (describing the growth in the number and dispersion of shareholders during the early
1900s). During the 30 years from 1901 to 1931, for example, the number of shareholders in AT&T
grew from 10,000 to 642,180. Id. at 55.
39. Id. at 139.
40. See id. (describing a proxy nominee as a "dummy" chosen either by management or the
opposition and the proxy machinery as the means by which the shareholder's "power is separated
from him").
41. To a large extent, shareholder democracy was replaced by the "Wall Street Rule," under
which those shareholders unhappy with governance decisions would vote with their feet by selling
their holdings. See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1287 (1991) (describing the Wall Street
Rule); Barnard, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 45 (cited in note 6) (describing the same). To the extent this
process causes stock prices to decline, it can result in a form of indirect monitoring of governance
decisions through the takeover market. See, for example, Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Share-
holder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977). The effective-
ness of the stock market in monitoring corporate governance is limited, however, both because
individual governance decisions may have a marginal effect on stock price and because of the costs
and dislocations associated with takeovers. See, for example, Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 526 (cited
in note 12); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assess-
ment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1150 (1984).
Commentators have recently observed that changes in the nature of institutional investment have
made employment of the Wall Street Rule more difficult. Coffee, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1277-79;
Barnard, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 83.
1138 [Vol. 46:1129
1993] LEGITIMACY TO LOGIC 1139
III. THE FEDERAL PROXY RULE S
Congress entered the regulation of corporate voting by passing the
federal securities laws. Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 establishes federal regulation of the proxy voting process. Rather
than legislating specific laws to deal with proxy voting, Congress dele-
gated the rulemaking function to the SEC. Section 14(a) does not im-
pose any substantive requirements in connection with a proxy
solicitation; it simply makes the solicitation of proxies without comply-
ing with the SEC rules unlawful. 2
The legislative direction Congress gave the SEC to develop a sys-
tem of proxy regulation-delegation paralleled in a number of other ar-
eas in the Exchange Act-has been described as a political
compromise.4 Industry insiders who testified in the hearings preceding
the adoption of the Exchange Act were concerned about the burdens
imposed by federal regulation." They believed that the newly created
SEC would be more responsive to the concerns of corporate America
and the stock exchanges. 4 Accordingly, broad delegation of rulemaking
authority to the SEC in place of substantive legislation decreased their
opposition to the legislation.
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to make
rules governing the solicitation of proxies "in the public interest or for
42. Rule 14a-1(1) defines a proxy solicitation as any request for a proxy; any request "to
execute or not to execute or revoke a proxy"; or "[t]he furnishing of a form of proxy or other
communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the pro-
curement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1) (1992). The definition of
a solicitation has been given a broad interpretation by the courts. See, for example, Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d
Cir. 1966); SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
43. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 456-60 (1990) (describing the delegation to the SEC as allowing Congress
to avoid conflict over specific statutory reforms); Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall
Street 82-100 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982) (describing political processes leading to enactment of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
44. Congress held a series of hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency and the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce regarding the regulation of
securities trading and exchange practices in March and April of 1934, which culminated in the
adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See "Stock Exchange Practices," Hearings before
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ("Senate Hearings");
"Stock Exchange Regulation," Hearings before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ("House Hearings"). The legislative history of the 1934 Act,
including the Senate and House Hearings, is reprinted in Jack S. Ellenberger and Ellen P. Mahar,
comps., Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(F.B. Rothman, 1973) (11 vols.) ("Legislative History'.
45. In particular, exchange leaders feared the Federal Trade Commission, which had previ-
ously administered the federal securities laws, because they perceived that it was under the control
of the pro-enforcement drafters of the federal legislation. See Seligman, The Transformation of
Wall Street at 97 (cited in note 43).
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the protection of investors. '46 The SEC has exercised this authority by
promulgating extensive regulations. The federal proxy rules require
anyone soliciting proxies under this provision to make certain required
disclosures, to follow specified procedures, and to abstain from making
false or misleading statements. These burdens increase if the proxy so-
licitation concerns the election of directors.
Rule 14a-3 of the Commission's proxy rules requires anyone solicit-
ing a proxy, with certain exceptions," to furnish the shareholder with a
written proxy statement prior to or concurrent with the solicitation.48
The proxy statement must include a description of the subject of the
solicitation, a list of parties interested in the solicitation, a description
of the person or entity making the solicitation, and an explanation of
the rules and procedures governing the proxy process.49 The rules re-
quire disclosure tailored to the issue for which proxies are being solic-
ited. For example, if the issue is election of directors, Schedule 14A
requires information about the nominee and incumbent directors, in-
cluding a description of the nominees, the composition of the board of
directors, a description of the attendance by incumbent directors at
board meetings during the prior fiscal year and a summary of their
committee service, and a description of director compensation."
The proxy statement must be pre-filed with the SEC before it may
be used to solicit proxies. Rule 14a-6 provides for a ten-day waiting pe-
riod after the proxy statement is filed before it may be distributed to
shareholders. Distribution of the proxy statement or solicitation of
proxies before the proxy statement has been "cleared" by the SEC is
known as "gun-jumping" and is a violation of the proxy rules.
Special rules apply to solicitation of proxies in connection with the
election or removal of directors. Rule 14a-11 requires the identification
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988) ("Section 14(a)"). The SEC is
authorized only to regulate proxy solicitation with respect to securities registered under Section 12
of the Exchange Act-that is, securities listed on a national exchange and securities issued by large
publicly held corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) & (g) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
47. The circumstances under which a proxy statement must be delivered have been substan-
tially reduced by the recent amendments to the proxy rules. See Part V (describing the recent
amendments).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1992).
49. Regulation 14A and Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1992), specify the informa-
tion required in the proxy statement.
50. If proxies are solicited for an annual or special meeting at which directors will be elected,
the issuer must also send shareholders an annual report prior to or together with the proxy state-
ment. Rule 14a-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1992). See, for example, Ash v. GAF Corp., 723
F.2d 1090, 1094 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a corporation that sent its annual report by third class
mail four days before a proxy did not reasonably guarantee that shareholders would receive the
annual report at the same time or before the proxy materials). The annual report must include
selected information from the 10-K, including audited financial statements for the two most recent
fiscal years. See Rule 14a-3(b) (setting forth the information required in an annual report).
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of all participants in an election contest, both in the proxy statement
and in solicitations made prior to delivery of the written proxy state-
ment. Participants include the issuer, its directors, nominees for the po-
sition of director, and anyone soliciting proxies or financing the
solicitation of proxies. The Rule further requires detailed disclosure re-
lating to all such participants. Participants must disclose their occupa-
tion and relationship to the issuer, their ownership and other interests
in the securities of the issuer, including sources of funds for any securi-
ties purchased with borrowed funds, their criminal record, if applicable,
a description of their proposed activities in the proxy contest, and any
contribution they have made or will make in furtherance of the
solicitation.
The proxy rules also regulate shareholder access to the proxy
mechanism. Rule 14a-7 protects the shareholder's ability to oppose
management's position through the proxy process. The Rule provides
any shareholder who wishes to solicit in opposition to management with
the right either to obtain a list of shareholders from management or to
have management mail the insurgent's proxy materials to the share-
holders. The Rule gives management the option to mail the materials or
to provide the list, and if management elects to do the mailing, the
shareholder must pay the costs.51
Rule 14a-8 gives a shareholder who meets certain threshold re-
quirements the right to require management to include his or her pro-
posal in management's proxy statement. 2 This "shareholder proposal
rule" is the rule most fundamentally concerned with shareholder access
to the ballot and is considered in more detail below.
Finally, Rule 14a-9 is a general antifraud provision that bars the
use of false or misleading statements in connection with the solicitation
of a proxy.5 3 The Rule applies to all communications, oral or written,
that are part of a solicitation subject to Section 14(a) and bars both
affirmative misstatements and omissions.5 4 The federal courts have im-
plied a private right of action under Rule 14a-9; most litigation under
the federal proxy rules is based on this provision.
51. Rule 14a-7 was recently amended. See notes 191-92 and accompanying text (describing
the amendments to Rule 14a-7).
52. The Rule provides that management may exclude a shareholder proposal that falls within
any of thirteen specified categories, including a proposal that deals with "a matter relating to the
conduct of the ordinary business operations of the registrant" or a proposal that "relates to an
election to office." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1992). See Part IV.C.
53. See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (describing the
scope of the proxy antifraud provision).
54. This Rule is similar in structure to Rule 10b-5, the general antifraud provision. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
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IV. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BALLOT ACCESS
Federal law affects shareholder access to the ballot in connection
with both issue voting and election contests. To understand this effect,
it is necessary to explore further both the federal proxy rules relating to
shareholder access and the evolution of those rules.
A. Evolution of Federal Regulation and Rule 14a-8
The SEC's rulemaking under Section 14 initially reflected a percep-
tion that the SEC's role would be limited to addressing the problems
introduced into the voting process by the replacement of personal at-
tendance with proxy solicitations. In adopting early proxy rules, the
SEC described its mission as an attempt to replicate the old-style an-
nual meeting that was personally attended by shareholders.5 5 Commis-
sioner Robert H. O'Brien explained:
It seems to me that the heart of the problem lies in the failure of corporate practice
to reproduce through the proxy medium an annual meeting substantially
equivalent to the old meeting in person. I know that the old-fashioned meeting
cannot be revived. Admittedly, that is impossible. It is not impossible, however, to
utilize the proxy machinery to approximate the conditions of the old-fashioned
meeting. 6
The proxy rules were designed to enable shareholders to retain,
while voting by proxy, the same state and common-law rights of corpo-
rate governance that they had exercised previously through attendance
and participation at the annual meeting. SEC Chairman Ganson Pur-
cell explained:
[T]he rights that we are endeavoring to assure to the stockholders are those rights
that he has traditionally had under State law, to appear at the meeting; to make a
proposal; to speak on that proposal at appropriate length; and to have his proposal
voted on. 7
The proxy rules reflect this deference to state law. The earliest ver-
sion of the rules simply required a minimal degree of disclosure and
prohibited false and misleading statements. 8 Almost immediately, how-
55. See Brief for SEC at 17, SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947) (indi-
cating the SEC goal, through proxy rules, of duplicating as closely as possible the conditions for
effective self-governance that prevailed at the type of annual meeting that shareholders attended
in person), cited in Friedman, 63 Harv. L. Rev. at 807 n.45 (cited in note 6).
56. SEC Commissioner Robert H. O'Brien, Address Before the Conference Board 3 (Jan. 21,
1943), quoted in Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Cam-
paign GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 419, 438 n.88 (1971).
57. Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules, Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and
H.R. 2019 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sesa.
172 (1943) (statement of SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell).
58. Even the provision against false and misleading statements promptly acquired a substan-
tive overtone as the SEC used it to redress insider attempts to gain shareholder approval of unfair
practices by depriving shareholders of full information about the transactions. See, for example,
[V ol. 46:11291142
LEGITIMACY TO LOGIC
ever, the SEC found that these requirements forced ii to consider the
issue of ballot access.
Although the right of shareholders to make proposals at annual
meetings predated the passage of the federal securities laws, the re-
placement of personal attendance with proxy voting made it difficult for
a shareholder to inform other shareholders of his or her intention to
raise such a proposal. Shortly after the SEC had adopted the first proxy
rules, the Bethlehem Steel case forced the SEC to consider how its reg-
ulation of the proxy voting process impaired shareholder-initiated
proposals.59
A shareholder of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation informed the
management, shortly before the company's annual meeting, of his in-
tention to make a motion at the meeting to amend the bylaws to pro-
vide that the shareholders would choose the company's auditors.
Management made no mention of the proposed motion in the proxy
solicitation materials that were distributed to shareholders. The share-
holder complained to the SEC that management's failure to mention
the proposed motion made its proxy solicitation false and misleading in
violation of the SEC's new proxy rules. Bethlehem responded that it
was under no obligation to solicit proxies for a shareholder proposal.
The SEC decided that failure by a company to mention in its solic-
itation materials an issue that it knew would be raised at the annual
meeting rendered the materials false and misleading.60 It is not clear,
however, that this position was supported by existing law, particularly
in cases in which the shareholder proposal was completely unrelated to
the subject for which management was soliciting proxies. 1 The federal
rules did not require management to solicit proxies at all. Arguably,
Note, Corporate Recapitalization by Charter Amendment, 46 Yale L. J. 985 (1937) (describing the
solicitation for shareholder approval of a recapitalization plan for Consolidated Film Industries
and SEC objections to the solicitation on the basis that it violated the new rules prohibiting false
and misleading statements in proxy solicitations).
59. The description of the Bethlehem Steel proxy contest is taken from Dean, 24 Cornell L.
Q. at 503-06 (cited in note 6).
60. The SEC took this position in a number of individual cases during the 1938 and 1939
proxy seasons. Robert B. von Mehren and John C. McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in
the Administrative Process, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 728, 740-41 (1964). See, for example, 5 SEC
Annual Rep. 62 (1939) (finding it misleading for management to omit a shareholder proposal from
a proxy statement). The SEC appeared concerned about the practical problems imposed on the
voting process when management, knowing of a proposed motion, used its control of the proxy
process to disenfranchise shareholders with respect to that motion. See Bernstein and Fischer, 7 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 233-37 (cited in note 6) (discussing the implications of partial management
solicitation).
61. See Bernstein and Fischer, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 234 n.35 (cited in note 6).
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under both state and federal law, management could select the issues
upon which it sought shareholder voting authority.62
To remedy this problem, the SEC amended its proxy rules. The
first amendment, enacted in 1940, required solicitation materials to dis-
close "any matters which the persons making the solicitations are in-
formed other persons intend to present for action at such meeting."63
Subsequently, in 1942, the SEC amended the rules6 to require manage-
ment to include in its proxy statement any proposed shareholder reso-
lution that was "a proper subject for action by the security holders."65
The SEC took the position that the shareholder proposal rule sim-
ply implemented the shareholder's rights to ballot access under state
law. 6 In other words, state law rather than the federal proxy rules was
to define the substantive relationship between shareholder and manage-
ment in governing the corporation. State law would determine the right
of a shareholder to nominate a candidate for the board of directors;
state law also would determine the proper subjects for a shareholder
proposal.67
62. See Dean, 24 Cornell L. Q. at 515-16 (cited in note 6) (arguing that management cannot
be required to refer to proposals it does not intend to raise at a meeting on the basis that omission
of a shareholder motion renders the material false and misleading if management's proxy material
states that "the management does not intend to bring anything in addition to the matters enumer-
ated above before the meeting").
63. Exchange Act Release No. 2376, 1940 SEC LEXIS 37, *6 (Jan. 12, 1940) (amending
Schedule 14A to require the person making a proxy solicitation to identify, in item 16, any other
matters he is aware will be raised at the meeting and his proposed disposition of the proxies solic-
ited with respect to those matters).
64. This provision was originally adopted as Rule X-14a-7 in Exchange Act Release No. 3347
(Dec. 18, 1942). It was subsequently renumbered as Rule 14a-8.
65. A contemporary scholar described this limitation as follows:
Where, under the law of incorporation, the charter or the by-laws, certain matters must
be initiated by the board of directors, a stockholder, by advising the management he intends
to make a motion on such matters, cannot compel the management to insert in the notice of
the meeting a statement that certain matters are to be acted upon, when it rests within the
discretion of the board whether or not such matters should be initiated. For example, if a
board of directors has the right to initiate the reduction of capital and a stockholder writes in
and states that he proposes to make a motion that the capital be reduced, it would seem that
such a motion may properly be declared out of order...
Dean, 24 Cornell L. Q. at 516 (cited in note 6).
66. Courts have determined that the proxy rules supplement shareholders' state law rights
and that state corporation law does not require a corporation to distribute a shareholder proposal
to other shareholders. See, for example, Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33, 41 (8th Cir. 1959) (stating that
"Rule [14a-8] affords a privilege, which does not otherwise ordinarily exist in favor of stockhold-
ers"); Carter v. Portland General Elec. Co., 362 P.2d 766 (Or. 1961) (holding that state law did not
require a corporation to submit information on a shareholder's proposal to other shareholders, nor
to permit a shareholder motion in an annual meeting, when the corporation in question was not
subject to the SEC's proxy rules).
67. See Opinion of Baldwin B. Bane, Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, Ex-
change Act Release No. 3638, 1945 SEC LEXIS 233, *2 (Jan. 3, 1945) (stating that "[s]peaking
generally, it is the purpose of Rule X-14A-7 [now Rule 14a-8] to place stockholders in a position to
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It soon became clear, however, that state statutory or decisional
law had not fully defined proper subjects for shareholder action. 8 In
SEC v. Transamerica Corp.,69 the SEC brought suit against Transamer-
ica under Rule 14a-8, seeking to compel the company to include certain
shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. 0 Because the Rule re-
quired inclusion of shareholder proposals only if they concerned a
"proper subject for shareholder action," management sought to exclude
the proposals on the grounds that they did not deal with subjects
proper under Delaware law.
On appeal, the parties focused on the issue of what constituted a
proper subject for shareholder action. 71 Delaware corporation law per-
mitted a corporation to include, as part of its charter, provisions that
limited, regulated, and defined the respective powers and functions of
the shareholders and the board of directors. The Transamerica charter
gave the board of directors the exclusive authority to decide whether to
submit proposed bylaw amendments for a shareholder vote. Manage-
ment claimed that this provision was permitted by state law and, there-
fore, a shareholder proposal to amend the bylaws was not a proper
subject for shareholder action unless approved by management.
The SEC argued that Transamerica's reading of proper subject was
too narrow. The court agreed, holding that a corporate bylaw could not
be used to frustrate "[tihe power conferred upon the Commission by
bring before their fellow stockholders matters of concern to them as stockholders in such corpora-
tion; that is, such matters relating to the affairs of the company concerned as are proper subjects
for stockholders' action under the laws of the state under which it is organized") (emphasis
added). The courts have accepted that the question of proper subject is determined by state law.
See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326, 329 (D. Del. 1946), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947) (stating that the inquiry as to whether shareholder proposals are
proper matters for action by shareholders at an annual meeting is to be answered "not by federal
but by Delaware law").
68. See Bernstein and Fischer, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 235 n.38 (cited in note 6) (explaining that
"[v]ery little case law exists as to what a stockholder may properly raise from the floor [of an
annual meeting]"); John G. Ledes, A Review of Proper Subject Under the Proxy Rules, 34 U.
Detroit L. J. 520 (1957) (addressing the question of what constitutes a proper subject for share-
holder action under the federal proxy rules).
69. 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
70. The proposals, offered by shareholder John J. Gilbert, were (1) to have the company's
auditors elected by the shareholders; (2) to amend the bylaws to eliminate the requirement that
notice of proposed bylaw amendments be included in the notice of meeting; (3) to change the
annual meeting from Wilmington to San Francisco; and (4) to require that a post-meeting report
be sent to shareholders. Transamerica, 163 F.2d at 513. For a detailed discussion of the Tran-
samerica case, see Frank D. Emerson and Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule:
Tihe Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 807, 809-11 (1952).
71. The court observed that most of the briefs and arguments were devoted to the issue of
what constituted a proper subject for shareholder action, so as to compel inclusion of the proposals
under the Rule. Transamerica, 163 F.2d at 515.
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Congress ...... 72 The court, however, did not expressly find that Con-
gress had authorized the SEC to override a charter provision or bylaw
that had been adopted in compliance with state law. 3 In addition, the
court did not explain whether its conclusion that Transamerica's posi-
tion was "overnice" and "untenable ' 74 was based on its interpretation
of Delaware law and, if so, what the basis was for that interpretation. 5
Management concerns about abuse of the shareholder right to bal-
lot access compounded the difficulties in determining and applying this
ambiguous state law concept of proper subject. Management claimed
that shareholder proposals could result in management liability, render
the solicitation material libelous, and cause needless expense to the cor-
poration. In the absence of clear state law, the SEC felt an obligation to
engage in rulemaking, both to clarify the rights of shareholders to ballot
access and to prevent the potential abuses feared by management.
Accordingly, the SEC began exercising its rulemaking power to set
forth the circumstances under which shareholders would be entitled to
ballot access.7 6 Starting with an opinion by the SEC Director of the
72. Id. at 518.
73. Nor did it explain how this finding, which appears implicit in the court's conclusion,
could be squared with the view that federal law deferred to the states to determine what issues
were proper subjects for a shareholder vote.
74. Transamerica, 163 F.2d at 518.
75. The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Carter v. Portland General Elec. Co., 362 P.2d
766 (Or. 1961), provides an interesting contrast to Transamerica. Portland General Electric was
not subject to the SEC's proxy rules. Accordingly, when shareholders sought to introduce a share-
holder proposal at an annual meeting, the corporation ruled the motion out of order. It subse-
quently refused to include information on the shareholder proposal in its proxy materials. The
court held that the SEC's proxy rules went beyond the shareholders' rights under state law, and
that it could not extend the rules to corporations that were not within the regulatory coverage. Id.
at 767-68.
The shareholders also sought to have the court declare their motion-an advisory proposal
dealing with the construction of a hydroelectric dam-a proper matter for a shareholder vote. The
shareholders cited Transamerica for the proposition that the issue proposed was a proper subject.
Id. at 768-69. The court refused, distinguishing Transamerica as involving the enforcement of an
SEC rule and stating that it had no basis upon which to decide whether a shareholder motion was
a proper subject. The court stated, "[I]f we adopt the rule it would be without limitation. It would
apply to any stockholder of any corporation. Nor does there exist any administrative body to make
any preliminary determination that a stockholder's proposal is a 'proper' one. In simple reality we
would be acting in a void." Id. at 769. After Carter, it is difficult to ascertain what state law (at
least in Oregon) the SEC can rely on to determine proper subject.
76. At the time the SEC began this undertaking, little evidence existed to support manage-
ment's concerns about abuse of the shareholder proposal processes. Early studies showed that the
process was seldom used, and that most proposals related to corporate governance and the share-
holders' role. For example, a study of the four year period from 1948 to 1951 indicated that pro-
posals most commonly addressed cumulative voting, selection of auditors, location of the annual
meeting, and post-meeting reports. See Emerson and Latcham, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 813-30 (cited
in note 70).
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Division of Corporation Finance77 and continuing in a series of amend-
ments to SEC Rule 14a-8'7 8 the SEC articulated the limits to a share-
holder's right to free ballot access.7 9 The current version of Rule 14a-8
contains thirteen bases upon which management can exclude a share-
holder proposal from the proxy statement as an improper subject.80
77. Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 SEC LEXIS 233, *2 (Jan. 3, 1945) (stating the
opinion of Baldwin B. Bane, Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, interpreting the
phrase "proper subject for action" in Rule 14a-8 to include proposals that relate directly to the
affairs of the particular corporation and not proposals that deal with general political, social, or
economic matters. "[I]t is the purpose of Rule [14a-8] to place stockholders in a position to bring
before their fellow stockholders matters of concern to them as stockholders in such corporation;
that is, such matters relating to the affairs of the company concerned as are proper subjects for
stockholders' action under the laws of the state under which it is organized)."
78. See Liebeler, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 425 (cited in note 5) (recounting the history of Rule 14a-8).
79. The real issue of shareholder access under Rule 14a-8 is the question of who pays for the
distribution of a shareholder proposal. If the proposal is included under the Rule in management's
proxy statement, the corporation pays for the costs of distribution. The rationale is that share-
holder proposals are not personal to the proposing shareholder, but relate to the concerns of all
shareholders with the governance of their corporation.
80. Rule 14a-8(c) provides:
The registrant may omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from its proxy
statement and form of proxy under any of the following circumstances:
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the registrant's domicile, not a proper sub-
ject for action by security holders.
NOTE: Whether a proposal is a proper subject for .action by security holders will
depend on the applicable state law. Under certain states' laws, a proposal that mandates
certain action by the registrant's board of directors may not be a proper subject matter
for shareholder action, while a proposal recommending or requesting such action of the
board may be proper under such state laws.
(2) If the proposal, if implemented, would require the registrant to violate any state
law or Federal law of the United States, or any law of any foreign jurisdiction to which
the registrant is subject, except that this provision shall not apply with respect to any
foreign law compliance with which would be violative of any state law or Federal law of
the United States.
(3) If the proposal or the supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commis-
sion's proxy rules and regulations, including Rule 14a-9 [§ 240.14a-9 of this chapter],
which prohibits false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;
(4) If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the
registrant or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to the proponent
or to further a personal interest, which benefit or interest is not shared with the other
security holders at large;
(5) If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the
registrant's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5
percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not
otherwise significantly related to the registrant's business;
(6) If the proposal deals with a matter beyond the registrant's power to effectuate;
(7) If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary busi-
ness operations of the registrant;
(8) If the proposal relates to an election to office;
(9) If the proposal is counter to a proposal to be submitted by the registrant at the
meeting;
(10) If the proposal has been rendered moot;
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1129
B. Exclusion of Shareholder Proposals Under Rule 14a-8
Many of the restrictions in Rule 14a-8 appear both sensible and
within the SEC's power to impose. Few commentators would argue with
the propriety of permitting management to exclude proposals that are
false and misleading81 or that call for the corporation to violate state or
federal law.8 2 Only the first basis for exclusion, however, which requires
that the proposal deal with a matter that is a proper subject for share-
holder action under state law, is strictly true to the SEC's original pre-
mise that proper subject is determined by state law.88
Moreover, many of the bases for exclusion are not grounded di-
rectly in state law. Under Rule 14a-8(c)(13), for example, the SEC per-
mits exclusion of shareholder proposals dealing with dividends." This
restriction could be based upon the traditional state corporate law doc-
trine that declaration of dividends is a matter within the discretion of
the board of directors.85 This principle arises, however, in the context of
litigation accusing directors of acting improperly and violating their
duty of care to the corporation. These challenges are limited by the
business judgment rule, which posits that directors should have a wide
degree of discretion in implementing business decisions without being
(11) If the proposal is substantially duplicative of a proposal previously submitted to
the registrant by another proponent, which proposal will be included in the registrant's
proxy material for the meeting;
(12) If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as a prior pro-
posal submitted to security holders in the registrant's proxy statement and form of proxy
relating to any annual or special meeting of security holders held within the preceding
five calendar years, it may be omitted from the registrant's proxy materials relating to
any meeting of security holders held within three calendar years after the latest such
previous submission: Provided, That-
(i) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during such preceding
period, it received less than three percent of the total number of votes cast in
regard thereto; or
(ii) If the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during such preceding
period, it received at the time of its second submission less than six percent of the
total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(iii) If the prior proposal was submitted at three or more meetings during
such preceding period, it received at the time of its latest submission less than 10
percent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(13) If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1992).
81. Rule 14a-8(c)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-S(c)(3) (1992).
82. Rule 14a-8(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1992).
83. Compare Grimes v. Centerior Energy Corp., 909 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
that the "development of enumerated exemptions in Rule 14a-8(c) serves to define the 'proper
subjects'" for "shareholder action under applicable state law").
84. For a description of early shareholder proposals addressing payment of dividends, see
Emerson and Latcham, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 819-21 (cited in note 70).
85. See Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 110 n.50 (cited in note 6) (suggesting this as a basis of
exclusion).
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subject to judicial attack.8  A shareholder vote that attempts to set or
change corporate dividend policy is quite different from litigation chal-
lenging a board decision as improper.87
Similarly, Rule 14a-8(a)(1) imposes minimum ownership require-
ments and holding period qualifications upon shareholders who seek in-
clusion of a proposal under Rule 14a-8. No uniform state or common-
law principle requires that a shareholder hold one percent or one thou-
sand dollars worth of a corporation's stock for a minimum of one year
before making a motion at a shareholders' meeting.88 No state law bars
a shareholder from making the same motion or proposal in successive
years, yet Rule 14a-8(c)(12) limits a shareholder's ability to do so. Addi-
tionally, state law does not restrict shareholders to dealing with issues
concerning more than five percent of the corporation's total assets or
extraordinary business matters.8 9 The SEC, however, has imposed these
limits on shareholder democracy.
Many of the restrictions imposed by the proxy rules can be attrib-
uted to a pragmatic effort by the SEC to limit the number of share-
holder proposals and to restrict use of the proxy statement to issues of
general importance to shareholders. Although such limits may be desir-
able, they have no foundation in state or common-law restrictions re-
86. See, for example, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (describing the busi-
ness judgment rule).
87. Indeed, it seems quite reasonable to permit shareholders to play a role in determining
corporate policy but also to allow the board of directors the freedom to exercise its discretion
without judicial supervision. See Hinton v. B.F. Goodrich Co., C.A. No. 7624, slip. op. (Ohio Ct.
App. May 7, 1975) (finding shareholder desire to communicate with fellow shareholders regarding
the amount of dividends paid by the corporation to be a proper purpose for access to the share-
holder list). The court stated, "The shareholders have a legitimate concern as to the policy of the
directors with respect to the portion of the earnings to be paid in dividends and the portion to be
retained in the business." Id.
88. This requirement is analogous, however, to state corporate law provisions that require
minimum shareholdings for access to the shareholder list or for relief from the security-for-ex-
penses requirement in derivative suits. See, for example, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 624 (McKinney,
1986) (requiring a shareholder to own at least 5% or own stock for six months to inspect the
shareholder list); Cal. Corp. Code § 1600 (West, 1990) (requiring a shareholder to own 1% of vot-
ing shares to inspect the shareholder list); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627 (McKinney, 1986) (requiring
security for expenses in a shareholder derivative suit unless the plaintiffs hold 5% of the
company).
89. Presumably this threshold represents the SEC's cost/benefit analysis and its determina-
tion that the costs of distributing and permitting a vote on a shareholder proposal are not justified
for proposals related to less than 5% of the corporation's business. This conclusion is hardly com-
pelling, given the total size of many large public companies' business operations. Moreover, as the
SEC itself has recognized, a proposal cannot automatically be considered trivial because it involves
a small dollar amount. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 1982
SEC LEXIS 691, *51-52 n.45 (Oct. 14, 1982) (interpreting the exclusion to provide that proposals
that fail to reach the specified economic threshold will be included "if a significant relationship to
the issuer's business is demonstrated on the face of the resolution or supporting statement").
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garding proper subjects to be raised at a shareholders' meeting. The
SEC's authority to impose these restrictions on the use of the proxy
mechanism is therefore unclear.
Apart from pragmatic concerns, the SEC's restrictions appear to
stem primarly from the general principle that state law vests manage-
ment, rather than shareholders, with the authority to run the corpora-
tion. State corporation statutes generally provide that the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors. °
This common provision suggests that a shareholder proposal affecting
the management of the corporation's affairs may improperly interfere
with the board's authority.91
The absence of modern judicial decisions voiding shareholder ac-
tion on the basis of these statutes suggests that their limitation on
shareholder activity is, at best, minimal. Additionally, it would seem
that framing the proposal as a shareholder recommendation rather than
an attempt to bind the board would address any limitation the statutes
impose.9 2 Although the SEC has been more receptive to shareholder
proposals framed as recommendations, it has, in many cases, allowed
management to exclude precatory proposals under Rule 14a-8(c)(5)9
90. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 141(a) (Michie, 1991) (stating that "[t]he business
and affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors"); Cal. Corp. Code § 300(a) (West, 1990) (stating that "the business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the direction
of the board"); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701 (McKinney, 1986) (stating that "the business of a
corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors").
91. See, for example, Aranow and Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control at 287-88
(cited in note 15) (describing the difficulty of determining whether management statutes limit the
types of issues shareholders may properly submit). In Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC,
432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), counsel for the Dow Chemical
Company argued that the ordinary business exclusion prevented shareholders from challenging the
operations of their company.
It is my opinion that the determination of the products which the company shall manufac-
ture, the customers to which it shall sell the products, and the conditions under which it shall
make such sales are related to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the Com-
pany and that any attempt to amend the Certificate of Incorporation to define the circum-
stances under which the management of the Company shall make such determinations is
contrary to the concept of corporate management, which is inherent in the Delaware General
Corporation Act under which the Company is organized.
Id. at 679.
92. See, for example, Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954) (upholding the
right of shareholders to vote on a nonbinding resolution endorsing the reinstatement of the peti-
tioner as president of the corporation). It appears that Louis Loss was primarily responsible for
the idea of framing shareholder proposals in precatory or advisory form. Louis Loss, 2 Securities
Regulation 908-11 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1961). See Manne, 24 Stan. L. Rev. at 486 (cited in note
6) (crediting Loss with popularizing this approach).
93. See Part IV.C.2 (discussing the ordinary business exclusion).
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Little explicit state law addresses the question of what constitutes
a proper subject for shareholder action. 4 Although the SEC alludes to
state law principles, few state statutes or judicial decisions expressly
forbid shareholder action on a particular subject. Professor Louis Loss
has explained that a judicial decision striking down shareholder efforts
to address corporate business as contrary to state statutory delegation
of corporate decisionmaking authority to management would be "highly
unusual." 5 Accordingly, both in determining appropriate criteria for
excluding shareholder proposals and in applying those criteria, the SEC
does not replicate passively the annual meeting process by applying
state law principles, but creates a federal common law as to what con-
stitutes a proper subject for shareholder action.96 The SEC has thereby
thrust itselP7 into the role of determining the proper balance of power
between management and shareholders. "' The next Part demonstrates
that the SEC has done so without any guiding principle. The following
94. The one viable source of state law concerns access to shareholder lists and other corpo-
rate documents. Many state statutes provide a right of access "for a proper purpose," and courts
have developed a body of law concerning what constitutes a proper purpose entitling a shareholder
to such access. See, for example, The Food and Allied Service Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 12551, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108 ([Del.] Chancery Ct. New Castle
County, May 19, 1992) (upholding a shareholder's right to inspect the list for the purpose of solic-
iting proxies in support of a resolution submitted solely for political and moral reasons); Credit
Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Credit Bureau of St. Paul, Inc., 290 A.2d 691 (Del. 1972) (ruling that an
inspection for the purpose of communication with fellow shareholders is proper, regardless of the
subject of communication); Hinton v. B.F. Goodrich Co., C.A. No. 7624, slip. op. (Ohio Ct. App.
May 7, 1975) (upholding shareholder access for the purpose of communicating with fellow share-
holders regarding the amount of dividends paid by the corporation). The state law decisions re-
garding proper subject matter are, in general, broader than the federal common law developed by
the SEC. See Part IV.C. But see State ex. rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn.
1971) (holding that communication regarding the company's munitions policy based on a share-
holder's political philosophy is an improper purpose for access to corporate documents).
95. Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 537-38 (Little, Brown, 1983).
96. See id. at 538 (stating that "[i]nevitably the Commission (normally its staff), while pur-
porting to find and apply a generally nonexistent state law, has been building a 'common law' of its
own as to what constitutes a 'proper subject' for shareholder action").
97. Rule 14a-8 provides the SEC with continuing supervision over the question of ballot ac-
cess by installing the SEC staff as the tribunal for applying the Rule. Thus, the SEC does not
merely legislate the regulatory bases upon which management may exclude a shareholder proposal;
it also interprets the regulations in particular cases and resolves disputes between management
and the proposing shareholder. This procedure is set out in Rule 14a-8(d), which provides that if
management seeks to exclude a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, it must notify the SEC of
its intention and the basis for the exclusion. After reviewing submissions from both management
and the proponent, the SEC staff will either direct management to include the proposal or will
concur in management's decision that the proposal may properly be omitted from the proxy
statement.
98. See 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at 1743 (cited in note 8) (quoting Sarah Teslick,
Executive Director of the Council for Institutional Investors, criticizing the SEC's substantive ex-
clusions under Rule 14a-8(c) as "controlling thought processes" of shareholders).
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Part examines whether legislative history can be used as a source for a
uniform theory to guide SEC rulemaking under Section 14(a).
C. Operation of the Power to Exclude Under Rule 14a-8(c)
The operation of the SEC's proxy rules substantively impacts cor-
porate governance. Specifically, the rules affect the balance of decision-
making authority between management and shareholders. These
consequences can be illustrated by examining the evolution of share-
holder activism and the SEC response in two specific areas: social re-
sponsibility proposals and executive compensation.
1. Social Responsibility Proposals
In the 1950s and 1960s, shareholders began to display increasing
concern over the corporation's relationship to society at large. Issues
such as the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, and environ-
mentalism became important not merely on the political agenda, but
also on the corporate agenda. Shareholders began to use the corporate
proxy to debate these issues. Some shareholders viewed the proxy as a
vehicle for airing their views before a large audience. Others felt that
social responsibility represented a legitimate corporate concern, and
that corporations should act responsibly, rather than merely emphasiz-
ing accumulation of profits. Arguably one factor relevant to a share-
holder's investment decision was the social and political philosophy of
the company in which the investment was made.9
Although scholars today debate the extent to which corporations
should respond to social and political concerns, 100 rather than focusing
exclusively on the economic goal of wealth maximization, most people
accept the place of social concerns in corporate decisionmaking. 1 1 Is-
sues of corporate social responsibility directly affect corporate profits;
for example, many in the corporate world refuse to do business with
firms that operate in South Africa. The extent to which a corporation
should consider social questions-such as plant closings, environmental
concerns, and dangerous products-that may limit its profitability to
99. See Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation at 539-40 (cited in note 95) (describ-
ing the development of the "ethical investor" movement).
100. For a recent examination of the role of the corporation in the political process, see
Fisch, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 587 (cited in note 11).
101. See, for example, David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Edwin M. Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 Hastings L. J. 1287 (1979). But see Alfred
Rappaport, Let's Let Business Be Business, N.Y. Times § 3 at 13 (Feb. 4, 1990) (arguing that
corporate participation is an inefficient way to solve social problems and that "[t]he corporation's
only social responsibility [should be] to increase its value to 'stakeholders' ").
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shareholders presents a fundamental corporate governance issue. Cor-
porations have been criticized for a lack of social responsiveness, and
investors, as well as consumers, increasingly seek corporations that
meet particular social or political agendas. 102
In the 1950s and 1960s, however, corporate management viewed
shareholders' efforts to focus corporate decisionmaking on issues of so-
cial and political concern as inappropriate; management opposed the
use of the proxy statement to debate such issues. The SEC, which had
previously allowed management to exclude shareholder proposals made
"primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, ra-
cial, religious, social or similar causes," supported management's
view.103 In 1951, the SEC used Rule 14a-8(c) to permit the Greyhound
Corporation to exclude a shareholder proposal to abolish segregated
seating on its buses.104 The court in Greyhound deferred to the SEC's
decision to permit exclusion of the proposal.'
The SEC's position regarding social action proposals persisted and
resulted in fairly limited use of the shareholder proposal rule until the
late 1960s. In 1969, the SEC interpreted the Rule to permit the Dow
Chemical Company to exclude a shareholder proposal requesting the
board of directors to "consider the advisability of adopting a resolution
setting forth an amendment to the composite certificate of incorpora-
tion of the Dow Chemical Company that the company shall not make
napalm."'0 6 In the now-famous case of Medical Committee for Human
Rights v. SEC, the Second Circuit indicated, albeit in dictum, its strong
disapproval of the SEC's interpretation: "Our own examination of the
issue raises substantial questions as to whether an interpretation of
Rule 14a-8(c)(2) which permitted omission of this proposal as one moti-
vated primarily by general political or social concerns would conflict
with the congressional intent underlying Section 14(a) of the Act."' 07
The court explained that the controversy surrounding the manufacture
of napalm demonstrated that its continued manufacture was a matter
of great economic as well as social significance to the company. Warning
102. An example is the development of "politically correct" mutual funds, which permit
shareholders to restrict their investment to companies with whom they agree on social issues. The
TIAA-CREF Social Choice Account allows investors to restrict their investment to companies that,
among other things, do not have economic ties to South Africa, produce nuclear energy, or produce
and market either alcoholic beverages or tobacco. See TIAA-CREF, Charting TIAA and the CREF
Accounts 12 (Winter 1991-92).
103. Exchange Act Release No. 4775, 1952 SEC LEXIS 121 (Dec. 11, 1952). The provision
allowing exclusion of social action proposals was Rule 14a-8(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2).
104. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
105. Id.
106. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1970), va-
cated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
107. Id. at 680.
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that "[tihe proper political and social role of modern corporations is, of
course, a matter of philosophical argument extending far beyond the
scope of our present concern," the court suggested that it was a subject
upon which the shareholders were entitled to input. 08
No reason has been advanced in the present proceedings which leads to the conclu-
sion that management may properly place obstacles in the path of shareholders
who wish to present to their co-owners, in accord with applicable state law, the
question of whether they wish to have their assets used in a manner which they
believe to be more socially responsible but possibly less profitable than that which
is dictated by present company policy.109
While the Second Circuit in Medical Committee for Human Rights
was expressing its disapproval of the SEC's approach to social policy
proposals, another similar battle was underway. The Campaign GM
proxy contest involved an effort by a group of shareholders to improve
the social responsibility of General Motors. The shareholder group,
which called itself the Project on Corporate Responsibility, submitted
nine shareholder proposals for inclusion in the General Motors proxy
statement. These included proposed bylaw amendments to add public-
interest directors and to form a Shareholders Committee for Corporate
Responsibility, and specific reforms dealing with air pollution, employee
safety, and other issues.1 0 Although the SEC required General Motors
to include two of the proposals, it permitted, without detailed explana-
tion, exclusion of the other seven."'
The SEC's more receptive treatment of the Campaign GM propos-
als may have been due, in part, to its recognition that Congress had
concerns about its approach to social and political proposals. Shortly
after the General Motors annual meeting in April 1970, Senator Ed-
mund S. Muskie proposed a bill to prevent corporations from excluding
shareholder proposals on the grounds that they dealt with social or po-
litical issues. On June 23, 1970, Senator Muskie introduced the Corpo-
rate Participation Bill," 2 which was designed to allow shareholders to
direct their corporations not only to increase profits but also "to ad-
vance the general welfare.""13 At a minimum, the bill indicated a belief
on the part of some members of Congress that social responsibility is-
sues represented a proper matter of shareholder concern.
The SEC responded by amending Rule 14a-8 in 1972. As redrafted,
the Rule permitted the exclusion of social action proposals only when
108. Id. at 681.
109. Id.
110. See Schwartz, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 419 (cited in note 56) (describing Campaign GM).
111. Id. at 451-62.
112. S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 23, 1970) in 116 Cong. Rec. 9547 (1970).
113. 116 Cong. Rec. 9547 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
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those proposals were not significantly related to the issuer's business.""
Although the SEC continued to view social action proposals with disfa-
vor and to find, in many cases, that the proposals could be excluded on
other grounds, 115 the SEC staff eventually came to accept many such
proposals as proper.
Management's continued opposition to the inclusion of social ac-
tion proposals resulted in further modifications to Rule 14a-8. The SEC
responded to management predictions that Rule 14a-8 would open
floodgates and overwhelm corporations with social action proposals by
adopting procedural restrictions to ballot access. Although social action
proposals could not be eliminated on the basis of their content, they
could be discouraged by imposing minimum ownership requirements,
limiting each shareholder to a single proposal, and barring resubmission
of proposals unless they garnered a specified percentage of affirmative
votes.
Finally, the effect of the SEC's opposition, lasting over twenty-
seven years, to the introduction of social action proposals by sharehold-
ers prevented shareholders from exploring, through the voting process,
the philosophical question of the degree to which corporate social re-
sponsibility is necessary or appropriate. This development was
thwarted during a time when corporate growth and the increasing dom-
inance of American business should have brought the issue to the
forefront.
2. Executive Compensation and the Ordinary Business Exclusion
The provision of Rule 14a-8 that allowed management to exclude
social action proposals is closely related to a current exclusion. Rule
14a-8(c)(5) permits management to omit proposals that relate to the
ordinary business operations of the issuer. The SEC explained the ra-
tionale behind this exclusion" 6 to Congress as follows:
114. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 1972 SEC
LEXIS 155 (Sept. 22, 1972).
115. Social action proposals are commonly excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(5) as relating to
ordinary business operations. Recently, for example, the SEC staff has determined that share-
holder proposals dealing with corporate charitable contributions may be excluded on this basis.
See, for example, Exxon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 209 (Feb. 19,
1992); Pacific Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 214 (Feb. 20,
1992). In addition to the difficulties of applying the ordinary business operations exclusion to pro-
posals that raise substantial policy questions, see note 120 and accompanying text, the staff's posi-
tion hinders shareholder control of the corporation's political and social speech. See First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978) (referring to mechanisms available to share-
holders, under state corporation law, to monitor and control corporate political speech with which
they disagree).
116. This exclusion was added to the rule in 1954. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 1954 SEC LEXIS 38 (Jan. 6, 1954).
1155
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The policy motivating the Commission in adopting the rule ... is basically the
same as the underlying policy of most State corporation laws to confine the solu-
tion of ordinary business problems to the board of directors and place such
problems beyond the competence and direction of the shareholders. The basic rea-
son for this policy is that it is manifestly impracticable in most cases for stockhold-
ers to decide management problems at corporate meetings.11
Attempts by shareholders to dictate minute details of corporate opera-
tions, even if legal under state law, would presumably interfere with the
board's statutory mandate to oversee the operation of the company.118
The extent to which state corporation law compels adoption of the
ordinary business exclusion is questionable at best. The incongruity in
the SEC's position is particularly clear with respect to proposals for
charter amendments, as most state corporation statutes explicitly grant
shareholders the right to amend the corporate charter.'1 " Additionally,
it would seem that shareholder proposals addressing business opera-
tions would more appropriately relate to the shareholders' financial in-
terests in the corporation than would social policy proposals.
The SEC has fashioned a test for determining when a proposal falls
within the exclusion for ordinary business operations that examines the
"policy implications" of each proposal. A proposal that addresses sub-
stantial policy concerns will not be excludable under Rule 14a-
8(c)(5). 20 Thus, the current position of the SEC appears to be directly
contrary to its pre-1972 posture that social policy concerns were not
properly addressed through the proxy process.12 '
117. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated
as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), (citing Hearings on SEC Enforcement Problems before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 118
(1957) (statement of SEC Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong)).
118. Shareholder participation in decisions about employee compensation also raises the is-
sue of whether this constitutes impermissible interference with the directors' control of the corpo-
ration. See notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
119. See, for example, Grimes v. Centerior Energy Corp., 909 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (al-
lowing exclusion of a shareholder proposal to amend the charter to limit the company's capital
expenditures as relating to ordinary business operations).
120. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, *31-32 (Nov. 22, 1976) (stating that proposals "which
have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in them" will not be excluded by
Rule 14a-8(c)(7) because this Rule only excludes "proposals that deal with truly 'ordinary' busi-
ness matters ... that are mundane in nature and do not involve any substantial policy or other
considerations"). See also Roosevelt v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 426 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (describing the distinction between ordinary business operations and matters involving
substantial policy considerations for purposes of the Rule 14a-8(c)(7) exemption); Grimes, 909
F.2d at 531-32.
121. In Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as
moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), Dow Chemical Company sought to omit a shareholder proposal alterna-
tively on the grounds that it was a social action proposal and excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(2) or
that it related to ordinary business operations and was excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(5). The
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The application of the ordinary business operations exclusion dem-
onstrates the problems created by leaving the determination of proper
subject matter to the SEC staff. Indeed, the issue is so difficult that the
SEC frequently reverses its original staff position regarding what con-
stitutes a proper subject."
Two recent shareholder proposals highlight the difficulty in deter-
mining which issues are proper proxy concerns. A shareholder recently
submitted a proposal requesting the Cracker Barrel company's board of
directors to implement nondiscriminatory hiring policies relating to sex-
ual orientation and to incorporate such policies in the company's em-
ployment policy statement.1 2 3 In light of the current attention paid to
hiring policies regarding sexual orientation-such as the debate over
the military exclusion of homosexuals 2 ' and the controversial Amend-
court observed that this argument attempted to place the proponent of the proposal in a catch-22
situation. The court stated:
[I]t is also apparent that the two exceptions which these rules carve out of the general re-
quirement of inclusion can be construed so as to permit the exclusion of practically any share-
holder proposal on the grounds that it is either "too general" or "too specific." Indeed, in the
present case Dow Chemical Company attempted to impale the Medical Committee's proposal
on both horns of this dilemma: in its memorandum of counsel, [Dow] argued that the Medical
Committee's proposal was a matter of ordinary business operations properly within the
sphere of management expertise and, at the same time, that the proposal clearly had been
submitted primarily for the purpose of promoting general political or social causes.
Id. at 679.
122. See, for example, Pacific Telesis, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 104
(Feb. 2, 1989) (reinterpreting the ordinary business operations exclusion as inapplicable to share-
holder proposals regarding plant closings); Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Se-
curity Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, *31-32 (Nov. 22, 1976)
(reversing an earlier interpretation that proposals dealing with the construction of nuclear power
plants constituted an ordinary business concern and stating that "[i]n retrospect, it seems appar-
ent that the economic and safety considerations attendant to nuclear power plants are of such
magnitude that a determination whether to construct one is not an 'ordinary' business matter").
See also Pacific Telesis Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 214 (Feb. 20,
1992) (allowing the corporation to exclude a shareholder proposal dealing with charitable contribu-
tions to Planned Parenthood as dealing with a matter that relates to the company's ordinary busi-
ness operations. The SEC stated that staff positions taken in earlier letters, requiring inclusion of
similar proposals, "were in error."); Minow, 21 Stetson L. Rev. at 236 (cited in note 6) (describing
the reversal of an SEC no-action position regarding exclusion of shareholder tobacco proposals);
Roosevelt, 958 F.2d at 428 (describing the Commission's reversal of staff policy regarding whether
proposals that request preparation of reports to shareholders are excludable).
123. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,418 (Oct. 13,
1992). The proposal requested the Cracker Barrel board to "1) implement nondiscriminatory poli-
cies related to sexual orientation, and 2) add explicit prohibitions against such discrimination to
the Company employment policy statement." Letter Inquiry dated July 13, 1992, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
at 77,285.
124. See, for example, Associated Press, Judge Says Navy Can Discharge Gay Sailor, N.Y.
Times § A at 20 (Feb. 11, 1993); Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Groups Regrouping for War on Military
Ban, N.Y. Times § A at 26 (Feb. 7, 1993); Adam Clymer, G.O.P. Threatens Filibuster To Force
Vote on Gay Ban, N.Y. Times § A at 17 (Feb. 3, 1993).
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ment 2 in Colorado125-one might think that the Cracker Barrel propo-
sal clearly presented the "substantial policy considerations" that
remove it from the category of proposals excludable because they relate
to ordinary business matters.128 Nonetheless, the SEC staff determined
that the proposal properly could be excluded as an ordinary business
matter. The Commission affirmed the staff position.127
The SEC staff took a markedly different position with respect to a
proposal by an Eli Lilly & Company shareholder. The Lilly proposal
requested the board of directors to adopt a price restraint policy by
November 1, 1993.128 When Lilly sought to exclude the proposal under
Rule 14a-8(c)(7), claiming that drug pricing decisions related to the
company's ordinary business, the shareholder argued that media atten-
tion to the issue of fairness in drug pricing had made it a "crucial na-
tional issue. ' 12 Although corporate pricing decisions would seem to fall
within the core of business decisions delegated to management rather
than to shareholders, the SEC staff refused to permit exclusion of the
proposal.13 0
The SEC staff's response to proposals addressing executive com-
pensation provides a particularly egregious example of the difficulty in
determining what constitutes a proper subject for a shareholder propo-
sal. For many years, the SEC considered employee compensation, in-
cluding compensation of the company's officers, to be a matter of
ordinary business operations.3 Accordingly, the SEC upheld manage-
125. Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution prohibits the Colorado state legislature and
other municipalities from passing laws that specifically protect homosexuals from discrimination.
Amendment 2 represents a grass-roots effort to restrict state and local governments in Colorado
from protecting homosexuals from discrimination. For further descriptions of Amendment 2 and
public reactions to its passage, see Dirk Johnson, A Ban on Gay-Rights Laws Is Put on Hold in
Colorado, N.Y. Times § A at 6 (Jan. 16, 1993); Editorial, Don't Boycott Colorado, but Help Fight
Back, N.Y. Times § A at 24 (Jan. 8, 1993); Dirk Johnson, Colorado Homosexuals Feel Betrayed,
N.Y. Times § 1 at 38 (Nov. 8, 1992).
126. See Coffee, Wall St. J. at A14 (Feb. 2, 1991) (cited in note 8) (arguing that the Cracker
Barrel decision demonstrates the inability of the SEC staff to "draw any intellectually valid line"
regarding which proposals present a proper subject for shareholder action).
127. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 51 (Jan. 15, 1993).
128. Eli Lilly & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 317, *13 (Feb. 25,
1993).
129. The shareholder cited both President Clinton's discussion of drug pricing during the
presidential debates and feature stories on drug pricing by the Wall Street Journal and ABC
Prime Time Live as evidence of the substantial policy concerns implicated by drug pricing. Id. at
*3.
130. The staff explained, "The proposal, which relates to the Company's fundamental busi-
ness strategy with respect to its pricing policy for pharmaceutical products, involves issues that are
beyond matters of the Company's ordinary business operations." Id. at *1.
131. In 1954, the SEC amended Rule 14a-8 by adding subsection (c)(5), which allowed man-
agement to exclude matters relating to ordinary business operations. Solicitation of Proxies, Ex-
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ment attempts to exclude shareholder proposals dealing with executive
compensation from the proxy statement.13 2
This position was ironic because Congress had specifically identi-
fied excessive management compensation as an abuse to which the fed-
eral securities laws, including Section 14(a), were addressed.
Representative Lea's statement during the floor debate on the bill is
illustrative:
[I]n recent years we have seen the directors of corporations, without the
knowledge of their stockholders, voting themselves vast bonuses out of all propor-
tion to what legitimate management would justify. We have had revelations of sala-
ries paid to directors and officers of great corporations which showed shameful
mismanagement; which showed that the men in charge of some of these corpora-
tions were more concerned in managing its affairs for their own benefit than for the
benefit of the stockholders. The history of the past few years has revealed that in a
number of instances these unconscionable bonuses and unconscionable salaries ex-
acted from the stockholders were continued notwithstanding the fact that divi-
dends were cut, and notwithstanding the fact that in some cases the common-
stockholders were deprived of any dividends.1 3 3
Other members of Congress viewed the legislation as an effort to
"make the integrity of the conduct of large business corporations in-
creasingly a matter of national rather than local concern....,, Con-
gress was particularly concerned about shareholders' inability to
change Act Release No. 4979 (Jan. 5, 1954). The SEC immediately interpreted this provision to
allow exclusion of shareholder proposals dealing with employment compensation. See Aranow and
Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control at 293 (cited in note 15) (describing the SEC's
approval, under the amended Rule, of AT&T's effort to exclude a shareholder proposal regarding
employee benefits); Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(deferring to the SEC's determination that pensions are "matters that primarily are the responsi-
bility and concern of the corporate management and its directors rather than that of its
stockholders").
132. See, for example, General Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
136 (Jan. 31, 1990) (ruling a proposal regarding incentive compensation excludable because it con-
cerned employee compensation); Newport Pharmaceuticals Int'l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2507 (Aug. 10, 1984) (holding a proposal regarding the formation of a special
committee to investigate the compensation of management personnel excludable as a matter relat-
ing to the conduct of the company's ordinary business); Scott Paper Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1242 (Dec. 27, 1989) (holding a proposal requiring that director compen-
sation be in the form of company common stock excludable because it dealt with a matter relating
to the conduct of the company's ordinary business); American Tel. & Tel. Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1618 (Dec. 8, 1988) (holding a proposal to impose a cap on the
amount of compensation and benefits paid by the company properly excludable).
133. Debate in the U.S. House of Representatives on H.R. 9323, 78 Cong. Rec. 7861-62
(1934), reprinted in Ellenberger and Mahar, 4 Legislative History (cited in note 44) ("House De-
bate") (statement of Representative Lea). Representative Lea concluded that the bill went far
beyond regulating national security exchanges, but would protect investors against fraud and im-
prudent investments by giving integrity to management of large corporations in which ownership
was separated from control. Id.
134. House Debate, 78 Cong. Rec. at 7922 (statement by Representative Mapes (quoting
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 149-50 (1932) (Stone, J., dissenting))).
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monitor and to control excessive executive compensation. 3 5 Congress
clearly indicated that federal regulation of the proxy solicitation process
was designed to curb excessive compensation abuses by enhancing
shareholder control.i3 6 Early shareholder proposals responded to this
objective, and many specifically addressed executive compensation, 3 7
until the SEC, determining that excessive compensation was not a
proper subject for shareholder action, removed the issue from share-
holder consideration. 138
Additionally, executive compensation represents an area of per se
conflict of interest between management and shareholders, a conflict
particularly difficult to address through other shareholder monitoring
mechanisms. Traditionally, executive compensation has been poorly
disclosed and difficult for shareholders to evaluate. Although courts
have allowed shareholders to attack excessive executive compensation
as waste through derivative suits,3 9 such litigation is too blunt an in-
strument to address the problem effectively, and the courts have proven
themselves poorly equipped to assess such challenges. 40
135. See House Debate, 78 Cong. Rec. at 7922-23 (statement of Representative Mapes)
(describing compensation excesses and abuses in connection with the American Tobacco litiga-
tion). Executive compensation at the American Tobacco Company was quite generous. For exam-
ple, in 1931, the president of the company received compensation totalling over two million dollars.
The compensation plan was attacked in several shareholder suits, and although parts of the com-
pensation were held excessive, several courts refused to strike down the plan because it had been
approved by the shareholders. Moreover, no court ordered the executives to repay part of their
compensation as excessive, although the compensation arrangement was modified in some respects.
For further discussion of the compensation arrangements and litigation, see Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 133 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting); William L. Cary and Melvin Aron Ei-
senberg, Corporations Cases and Materials 617-20 (Foundation, 6th ed. 1988).
136. See House Debate, 78 Cong. Rec. at 7961 (statement of Representative Dirksen) (identi-
fying the American Tobacco Company case as an "historic example" of abuse of the proxy process
and empowering the SEC through Section 13 to deal with compensation abuses); Comment, 33
Nw. U. L. Rev. at 930-32 (cited in note 28) (recounting abuses of the American Tobacco compensa-
tion plan and the resulting proxy regulation response). See also Report [To accompany H.R. 9323],
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History, Item 18
(cited in note 44) ("Rayburn Report") (citing principles of fair corporate suffrage as a means of
controlling unfair practices by corporate insiders).
137. See Emerson and Latcham, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 821-25 (cited in note 70) (describing
shareholder proposals on executive compensation during the 1948-51 proxy seasons).
138. See, for example, Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 46 (Jan. 10, 1990) (stating that "[t]he Division's existing position regarding proposals deal-
ing with compensation arrangements is that such matters relate to the conduct of a registrant's
ordinary business operations and may be excluded pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(7)"). Accord Int'l
Remote Imaging System, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 684 (May 24,
1989); The Centennial Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 955 (Sept. 7,
1989); and Manville Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 342 (March 3, 1989).
139. See, for example, Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 590-92 (1933) (finding that bonus pay-
ments to executives under corporate bylaws had "become so large as to warrant investigation").
140. See, for example, Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aft'd, 263 A.D.
815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941). The Heller court noted:
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Finally, in 1991, the SEC decided that executive compensation had
become an issue of such public significance that compensation decisions
no longer could be deemed a matter of ordinary business operations. In
May 1991, Linda C. Quinn, Director of the SEC's Division of Corpora-
tion Finance, gave early indications of the SEC's forthcoming reversal
by stating that shareholder proposals "aimed at reforming the compen-
sation process or setting criteria for executive and director pay . . .
would most likely be approved by the SEC staff in 1992."'l' The SEC
formally implemented this policy reversal in response to a series of no-
action requests during the 1992 proxy season.142 The SEC's statement
in Reebok International Ltd.143 is illustrative:
In view of the widespread public debate concerning executive and director
compensation policies and practices, and the increasing recognition that these is-
sues raise significant policy issues, it is the Division's view that proposals relating
to senior executive compensation no longer can be considered matters relating to a
registrant's ordinary business. Eventually the SEC concluded that executive com-
pensation was so important that it substantially amended and expanded its re-
quirements for disclosure of executive compensation in proxy statements and other
periodic reports under the Exchange Act.1 44
Unfortunately, both the SEC's original position and its recent
change of heart missed the point. Procedures for determining executive
compensation have been faulted for inhibiting productivity and ham-
pering the ability of U.S. corporations to compete globally. The opera-
tion of the proxy rules has limited shareholder voice in this area,
thereby frustrating the ability of shareholders to introduce executive
compensation monitoring procedures. In effect, the SEC's rules have
impeded the ability of the corporate structure to evolve to address the
Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these payments, but openness forces the confes-
sion that the pruning would be synthetic and artificial rather than analytic or scientific.
Whether or not it would be fair and just, is highly dubious. Yet, merely because the problem
is perplexing is no reason for eschewing it. It is not timidity, however, which perturbs me. It is
finding a rational or just gauge for revising these figures were I inclined to do so. No
blueprints are furnished. The elements to be weighed are incalculable; the imponderables,
manifold. To act out of whimsy or caprice or arbitrariness would be more than inexact-it
would be the precise antithesis of justice; it would be a farce.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the
Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. Corp. L. 231 (1983).
141. Corporate Governance Highlights, Investor Responsibility Research Center, Vol. 2, No.
24 (May 16, 1991).
142. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 30,851, 1992 SEC
LEXIS 1297, *5-6 (June 23, 1992) (describing the SEC's reversal in position and listing companies
for which the SEC required inclusion of proposals on executive compensation).
143. Reebok Int'l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 376, *1 (Mar. 16,
1992).
144. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, 1992 SEC
LEXIS 2468 (Oct. 16, 1992) (substantially revising the rules governing disclosure of executive com-
pensation to improve shareholder understanding of the nature and extent of this compensation).
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problem of excess compensation. The proxy process is designed to en-
able shareholder debate and voting to bring developing issues to the
attention of the shareholders. 14 5 In order to effect changes in the corpo-
rate structure, shareholders must be able to anticipate and to initiate
public debate, instead of awaiting SEC staff recognition146 that the is-
sues have developed into a significant policy matter.
D. Nomination of Directors
Closely related to the issue of shareholder ballot access with re-
spect to policy issues is access with respect to director elections. Indeed,
the area of director elections seems to be one in which shareholder par-
ticipation is most legitimate because state corporation statutes vest in
the shareholders the authority to elect the board of directors. 47 In spite
of congressional concern in 1934 that corporate insiders controlled the
election process, a concern to which the proxy regulations appear to be
addressed, 48 insider domination of the election process remains perva-
sive today.149
145. See Minow, 21 Stetson L. Rev. at 227-29 (cited in note 6) (describing recent efforts by
institutional investors to use shareholder proposals to affect corporate governance issues).
146. The SEC staff determination as to when an issue is proper for shareholder action was,
until fairly recently, immune from challenge even in court. See, for example, Peck v. Greyhound
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (refusing to enjoin proxy solicitation after the SEC upheld
a management decision to omit a shareholder proposal on the grounds that the shareholder had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or to demonstrate irreparable harm). Compare
Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205, 207 (6th Cir. 1984) (expressing "substantial reservations
concerning the existence of an implied private cause of action based upon a violation of rule 14a-
8"). Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the most recent circuit court deci-
sion upheld a private right of action. See Roosevelt v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d
416 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Even when courts nominally have permitted a shareholder to challenge the SEC's judgment,
they frequently defer to the agency's expertise in interpreting its own rules. See, for example,
Roosevelt, 958 F.2d at 426 (deferring to the SEC's interpretation of "ordinary business opera-
tions"); Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (deferring to the
SEC's interpretation of its own rule to permit exclusion of a shareholder proposal concerning pen-
sion issues as relating to ordinary business operations on the grounds that the SEC had inter-
preted its rules after full consideration of the matters involved, and its decision was not "clearly
erroneous"); Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1959) (deferring to the SEC decision to allow
exclusion of two shareholder proposals under the ordinary business operations doctrine even
though "[w]e think there would be room to differ with the Commission's judgment in respect to
the propriety and desirability of permissibly allowing these two proposals . . . ."). See also New
York City Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 969 F.2d 1430, 1435 (2d Cir. 1992) (Pollack, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the SEC's interpretation that a proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-
9(c)(7) is "entitled to great weight").
147. See Eisenberg, 83 Harv. L. Rev. at 1505 (cited in note 6) (arguing that shareholders are
entitled to nominate candidates for directorships as a corollary of their right to elect the board).
148. See Part VI.B.3.
149. See, for example, Minow, 21 Stetson L. Rev. at 227 (cited in note 6) (describing manage-
ment control of the process of electing directors). As Ms. Minow observes, the typical director
election involves the submission by management to shareholders of a single management-chosen
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The continued ability of corporate insiders to control director elec-
tions can be attributed, in part, to deficiencies in the federal proxy
rules. The proxy rules both have failed to provide affirmative access for
shareholders to participate in the nomination process and have
thwarted shareholder attempts at participation.
The most obvious omission from the federal proxy rules is a mech-
anism for shareholders to access the nomination process. The SEC took
a few tentative steps toward providing such access in the early 1940s.150
At the same time that the SEC began to address ballot access for share-
holder proposals, it considered the extent to which shareholders should
have direct access to the corporate ballot in connection with director
elections. In 1942, the SEC proposed a rule that would have required
corporations to include shareholder-nominated director candidates in
the corporation's proxy statement.151 Corporate management criticized
the rule on the grounds that it was unworkable; shareholders might
nominate unqualified candidates or create ballot confusion by nominat-
ing too many candidates. These interferences with effective corporate
management could prove costly in connection with the wartime, ef-
fort.152 Ultimately the SEC abandoned its efforts to pass the rule.153
The SEC has also interpreted other aspects of its rules to prevent
direct shareholder participation in the nomination process through use
of the proxy to debate election issues. For example, since the 1947
amendments, Rule 14a-8 has allowed management to exclude share-
holder proposals that relate to elections for office.15 4 Ironically, the ex-
clusion originated with a 1942 SEC proposal that would have permitted
slate of director candidates. Current law does not even permit shareholders to vote against a direc-
tor nominee-shareholders are limited to withholding a vote in favor of the nominee. As Professor
Eisenberg has observed, it is not clear under state law that management is entitled to use the
proxy machinery to designate director candidates. Eisenberg, 83 Harv. L. Rev. at 1506 (cited in
note 6).
150. Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 SEC LEXIS 44 (Dec. 18, 1942).
151. Id.
152. Barnard, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 54 (cited in note 6); J.A.C. Hetherington, When the
Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 Hofstra L. Rev.
183, 214 (1979).
153. See also Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules, Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R.
1821, and H.R. 2019 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
Although commentators have continually called for a rule permitting shareholders direct ac-
cess to the ballot to nominate candidates for the board of directors, the SEC has never re-proposed
such a rule. See, for example, Lipton and Rosenblum, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187 (cited in note 6);
Robert N. Shwartz, Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director
in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1139 (1974); Mortimer M. Caplin, Share-
holder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 Va. L. Rev. 141
(1953).
154. Adoption of Revised Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4037, 1947 SEC LEXIS
424 (Dec. 17, 1947).
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shareholders to nominate director candidates directly.1 5 The unfavora-
ble public response to that proposal led to a staff interpretation that
Rule 14a-8 did not permit shareholder proposals in support of a slate of
challengers. Subsequently, the SEC amended the text of the Rule to
exclude proposals relating to director elections explicitly. 156
Although the SEC has not interpreted the exclusion to bar general
proposals relating to election procedures, such as cumulative voting
rights and general qualifications for directors, 157 the provision prevents
a shareholder from using Rule 14a-8 to nominate or advocate the elec-
tion of a particular director.15 8 Furthermore, the SEC has allowed man-
agement to rely on the exclusion to bar any proposal that could be
viewed as interfering with election of existing directors or director
slates.' 59 An example of the SEC's acquiescence to management is its
response to Mobil's recent exclusion of a shareholder proposal seeking
to amend Mobil's bylaws to prevent citizens of OPEC countries from
serving on the board of directors.6 0 Mobil argued that the proposal
would have the effect of barring a sitting director, who was an OPEC
citizen, from re-election.'"' The SEC staff agreed that the proposal
could be excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(8) as relating to an election.' 62
Mobil's exclusion of the proposal was upheld by the courts.'68
Lacking direct ballot access under Rule 14a-8, the shareholder's
only alternative is a counter-solicitation as governed by Rule 14a-11."',
155. See notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
156. See note 80; Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 113 n.60 (cited in note 6).
157. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, *34-35 (Nov. 22, 1976) (explaining the scope of the
exclusion).
158. See, for example, SCI Systems, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
875 (Aug. 14, 1992) (permitting exclusion of a proposal nominating director candidates); CMT
Investment Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3382 (Mar. 27, 1981) (applying
Rule 14a-8(c)(8) to nominations for election to the board of directors).
159. See, for example, Tylan Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2530
(Sept. 25, 1987) (allowing exclusion of a proposal that would increase representation, on the direc-
tors slate, of certain groups, including minorities). The SEC staff has explained that even propos-
als relating to general director qualifications, which would otherwise be proper, may be excluded if
they relate to or would interfere with the election of current nominees. See, for example, Chicago
Milwaukee Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 961 (Sept. 23, 1992).
160. See Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1984) (describing the SEC
review of and response to the shareholder proposal).
161. Id. at 206.
162. The SEC staff advised Mobil that the "proposal and supporting statement call into
question the qualifications of Mr. Olayan for reelection and thus the proposal may be deemed an
effort to oppose management's solicitation on behalf of the reelection of this person." Id. at 207.
163. Id.
164. A counter-solicitation occurs when a group of shareholders propose their own slate of
candidates and conduct a solicitation in which they seek proxy authority to vote in favor of their
slate rather than the slate nominated by management. See Rule 14a-11(a).
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Under Rule 14a-11, a shareholder wishing to nominate a director, to
criticize an existing director, or to propose changes in director qualifica-
tions that would disqualify a member of the current board is relegated
to many of the same hurdles faced by a shareholder seeking control of
the company."' 5
Thus, although the SEC rules do not prevent a shareholder from
nominating a candidate or slate of candidates in opposition to manage-
ment's choices, they impede the ability of a shareholder to do so. Even
with the recent amendments, the rules continue to inhibit the ability of
a challenger seeking minority board representation as much as the rules,
inhibit shareholders seeking control of the company. 66 The rules also
impair a corporation from experimenting with the nomination and elec-
tion process. For example, the SEC has permitted exclusion of share-
holder proposals seeking to implement procedures for direct
shareholder nomination of directors. 1 7 Even if a corporation's charter
or bylaws allowed shareholders to nominate director candidates di-
rectly, it is likely that such nominations, if communicated to other
shareholders, would constitute solicitations under Rule 14a-1 and would
require compliance with the proxy rules.
V. THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE PROXY RULES
The SEC most recently amended the federal proxy rules on Octo-
ber 16, 1992.168 The amendments were adopted after a "comprehensive
review" of the proxy rules undertaken by the SEC' 9 in response to
165. See Union Elec. Co., Pub. Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 13,962, 1959 SEC
LEXIS 730, *5-6 (March 26, 1959) (finding that a shareholder proposal "which would censure all
of the present members of Union's board of directors, who are also management nominees for re-
election at the 1959 meeting, and declare all of them disqualified for re-election to office" consti-
tutes "a solicitation in opposition to the election of directors within the meaning of Rules 14a-1
and 14a-11 and therefore could be made only by use of a proxy statement" and requires coifipli-
ance with the rules pertaining to election contests).
166. See notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing the bona fide nominee rule).
167. See, for example, Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 242
(Feb. 14, 1990) (allowing exclusion under Rule 14a-8(c) of a proposal to allow large shareholders to
nominate director candidates on a common ballot with management).
168. See Proxy Rule Release, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2470 (cited in note 1).
169. The 1992 amendments were not the first comprehensive attempt by the SEC to re-
evaluate the federal system of proxy regulation. In 1977, the SEC commenced what it termed a
"Corporate Governance Proceeding" for the purpose of "re-examin[ing] its rules relating to share-
holder communications, shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process, and corporate
governance generally." SEC Staff Report on Corporate Accountability at 7 (cited in note 5). This
proceeding culminated in an 800 page report, prepared by the SEC staff, that attempted to evalu-
ate the system of proxy regulation in terms of current issues in corporate governance, corporate
accountability, and shareholder rights.
Following submission of the report to Congress, the SEC developed three alternative propos-
als, two of which would have substantially revised shareholder access to the ballot. The proposals
were introduced in Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 1982
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complaints that the rules were inefficient, 170 frustrated shareholder de-
mocracy,17 1 and interfered with free speech.1 7  Following this review,
the SEC published two sets of proposed rule changes 73 that generated
an enormous amount of controversy,.7 4 ranging from criticism that the
rule changes did not go far enough in removing impediments to share-
SEC LEXIS 691 (Oct. 14, 1982). Proposal I, a modification of existing procedures under Rule 14a-
8, imposed requirements that a shareholder own a specified percentage of securities for a minimum
time period before submitting a proposal and limited all shareholders to one proposal per annual
meeting. Proposal II would have retained the existing proxy rules but would permit issuers to "opt
out" and develop their own procedures for ballot access. Proposal III would have substantially
diminished SEC involvement by eliminating management's power to exclude a shareholder propo-
sal other than for improper subjects under state law and director election proposals.
Although the modifications were proposed with the stated objective of increasing shareholder
democracy, a divided SEC retreated from this principle and adopted Proposal I. Amendments to
Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 1983 SEC LEXIS 1011 (Aug. 16, 1983). Commis-
sioner Bevis Longstreth publicly dissented from this decision, which he criticized as a sharp re-
striction of shareholders' rights. Id. at *35. Many commentators agreed. One thing was clear: the
SEC's rule changes as adopted represented neither a wholesale attempt to eliminate the obstacles
imposed by the proxy process on corporate democracy nor an attempt to retreat from refereeing
the tension that the proxy access issue generated between shareholder democracy and protection
of corporations and their management from harassment and undue expense.
170. See, for example, Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises
Underlying the Current Push for Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. Corp. L. 163, 169-74 (1991) (identify-
ing and evaluating criticisms that the proxy rules were unduly burdensome).
171. According to the United Shareholders' Association, the proxy rules have "evolved into a
regulatory boa constrictor squeezing the power out of shareholder voting as a tool for holding
corporate officers and directors accountable." Shareholder Communication Proposals Produce
Second Tidal Wave of Comments, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1516, 1517 (Sept. 25, 1992).
172. In 1989, the California Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS") wrote to the
SEC proposing a comprehensive revision of the proxy rules designed to facilitate the participation
of institutional investors in corporate governance. Letter from Richard H. Koppes, CalPERS Gen-
eral Counsel, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC (Nov. 3, 1989),
reprinted in Institutional Investors: Passive Fiduciaries To Activist Owners 454 (Practising Law
Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series Number 704, 1990). CalPERS's
letter contained a variety of proposals as well as observations regarding the effect of the current
proxy rules on shareholder communications and corporate democracy. CalPERS's letter was fol-
lowed by a similar request for reform from the United Shareholders' Association ("USA"). See
Letter from United Shareholders' Association to Edward H. Fleischman, Commissioner, SEC
(Mar. 20, 1990). USA's letter, in particular, pinpointed flaws in the proxy rules that operate to
limit shareholder access to the proxy machinery. The SEC responded to the requests by initiating
a comprehensive review of its proxy rules and the proxy voting process.
173. See Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 29,315,
1991 SEC LEXIS 1204 (June 17, 1991) (containing the first proposed amendments to the proxy
rules); Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 30,849,
1992 SEC LEXIS 1296 (June 24, 1992) (containing the second proposed amendments).
174. See generally Symposium on the Proposed Proxy Rule Amendments, 17 J. Corp. L. 1
(1991).
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holder democracy 75 to arguments that the existing regulatory system
functioned properly and did not require amendment.
17 6
The amendments modify the federal proxy rules in four primary
areas: (1) filing requirements in connection with proxy solicitations; (2)
the "bona fide nominee" rule; (3) access to a shareholder list; and (4)
"bundling" of management proposals.177 The SEC justified the changes
in the first two areas as being required by the prior rules' undue inter-
ference with shareholder democracy. 78 The remaining changes address
problems involving the relationship between the federal proxy rules and
state law. All four changes, as enacted, reflect a compromise between
provisions that would have directly remedied the identified problem
and concerns raised by corporate commentators about potential
abuse.17 19 As a result of this compromise, each of the four provisions is
more complicated and provides more limited reform than earlier pro-
posals and suggestions.
The most highly publicized change was the SEC's decision to ex-
empt many solicitations 80 from the filing requirements' 8 ' of Section
14(a). 8 2 As amended, the proxy rules exempt all oral solicitations by
persons who do not seek proxy authority and who do not have an inter-
175. Among the important issues the SEC proposal did not address were shareholder access
to the proxy statement, nomination of directors, and confidential voting. Minow, 17 J. Corp. L. 149
(cited in note 6).
176. See, for example, Rosenbaum, 17 J. Corp. L. at 165 (cited in note 170) (arguing that
"the present system is essentially functioning quite well for shareholders").
177. The amendments also address several more technical matters. They require greater dis-
closure of the results of previous shareholder votes and of procedures for vote tabulations, reduce
the filing requirements in connection with election contests, provide circumstances in which solici-
tation will be permitted prior to the delivery of a proxy statement to shareholders, and modify
public access to preliminary proxy filings. See Proxy Rule Release, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2470 at *43-
59, *69-70 (cited in note 1).
178. See id. at *22-23 (acknowledging that the "chilling effect" and cost of compliance with
filing rules may limit shareholder discussion of management performance and other corporate is-
sues); id. at *73-74 (describing the proxy rules as having "erected unnecessary impediments" to
shareholder voting for a partial slate of opposition director candidates).
179. See Roberta S. Karmel, Can We Talk? A Greater Voice for Investors, N.Y. L. J. 9 (Dec.
7, 1992) (describing the new proxy rules as "a political compromise between reform of the proxy
rules, supported by institutional investors, and the status quo, supported by public corporations").
180. See Proxy Rule Release, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2470 at *20-34 (cited in note 1) (describing
the exemption).
181. The exemption was the SEC's response to criticism of the definition of proxy "solicita-
tion" to include virtually any communication to shareholders intended to influence their opinions
about the company. See id. at *12-15. Rather than taking the obvious step of narrowing the defini-
tion of solicitation, the SEC retained the definition but exempted most shareholders who were not
seeking control or financially involved in an election contest from the regulatory requirements as-
sociated with solicitation. The SEC also exempted shareholder announcements of their voting deci-
sions and the reasons for those decisions by adopting a safe harbor exclusion for such
announcements. See id. at *40-43.
182. Any applicable filing requirements under § 13(d) continue to apply. See id. at *17.
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est in the subject of the solicitation from filing and pre-filing require-
ments. 183 Written solicitations under similar circumstances are also
exempt from filing, except that beneficial owners of more than five mil-
lion dollars of the issuer's securities must submit copies of written solic-
itations contemporaneously to the SEC.18 4
The old "bona fide nominee" rule, Rule 14a-4(d), prohibited an op-
position shareholder from including management's director candidates
on a proxy without the candidate's consent.88 Because shareholders can
submit only one valid proxy in connection with an election,'86 this Rule
limited the ability of a shareholder to split his or her ticket between
management-sponsored nominees and opposition candidates. This Rule
also prevented challengers who sought to nominate only a partial oppo-
sition slate from offering shareholders the opportunity to exercise full
voting rights. Thus, the Rule directly limited shareholder choice in con-
nection with the election of directors. 187
Although the SEC faced pressure to adopt a general proposal to
allow shareholder choice among different slates of director candidates,
it refused. 88 Instead, the SEC's amendment to Rule 14a-4(d) is a model
of unnecessary confusion in the name of political compromise.'89 Oppo-
sition shareholders are instructed that they can neither include the
names of company nominees on their proxy nor provide an opportunity
for shareholders to write in the names of company nominees to "round
out" a short slate. Challengers can, however, solicit general authority to
183. Interestingly, the exemption includes officers and directors of the issuer who engage in
solicitations at their own expense. See id. at *30 (explaining that this exemption will further the
interests of shareholders by providing more discussion of matters presented for a vote).
184. See id. at *35-40 (describing the notice requirement). This provision was a response to
corporate commentators who argued that institutional investors could conduct "secret" solicitation
campaigns against management proposals. See id. at *25. It is unclear why the SEC viewed this as
an abusive practice.
185. See id. at *74 (describing the operation of the rule).
186. Id. at *73.
187. For a more detailed discussion of how the bona fide nominee rule acted as a barrier to
minority representation on the board, see Ronald J. Gilson, Liii A. Gordon, and John Pound, How
the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minor-
ity of Directors, 17 J. Corp. L. 29 (1991).
188. See Proxy Rule Release, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2470 at *75 (cited in note 1). The SEC de-
scribed proposals for a universal ballot as "appealing since the shareholder could make such a
selection if he or she attended the annual meeting in person." It decided nonetheless to limit its
attention to the "more limited problem caused solely by its own rules." Id.
189. The SEC's response to competing interest groups with respect to Rule 14a-4(d) is per-
haps the most blatant example of its rulemaking approach: political expediency at the sacrifice of
principled goals. The description used by Judge Posner in criticizing a recent FCC compromise
rule is appropriate: "The impression created is of unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg
complexity among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring supplicants who have
somehow to be conciliated." Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1050 (7th Cir.
1992).
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vote the proxies in favor of company nominees and can specify, or ask
solicitees to specify, nominees for whom the proxy will not be voted. " '
The amendments also reflect a compromise position with respect to
the provision of shareholder lists. The SEC did not return to its original
position of federalizing the right of access to a shareholder list.191 In-
stead, the SEC retained its previous system under which an issuer can
elect to provide a list or to mail materials on behalf of a shareholder. As
amended, Rule 14a-7 includes more detailed procedures governing both
the shareholder's request for a shareholder list and the corporation's
response to the request. It also requires a corporation that chooses to
mail the shareholder's materials to do so more promptly. The provision
falls far short, however, of guaranteeing shareholders information
equivalent to that which the issuer possesses.1 92
Finally, the amendments incorporate the requirement that manage-
ment "unbundle" groups of issues by permitting shareholders to vote
on each matter separately.193 Under amended Rule 14a-4(a), the form of
proxy provided to shareholders must permit a separate vote on each
issue for which voting authority is solicited. The Rule, however, has a
190. See Proxy Rule Release, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2470 at *79-83 (cited in note 1). The amend-
ment creates substantial potential for confusion. Because the soliciting shareholder cannot include
the names of management's nominees, it cannot disclose its preferred selections for candidates to
round out the short slate. No single proxy can contain the names of all director candidates, so
shareholders must compare the company slate with those of the opposition to choose their pre-
ferred candidates and must modify the opposition's proxy to indicate these choices. Moreover, as
the model form of proxy contained in the release is drafted, shareholders are not instructed to
write in their choices, but to write in the names of nominees for which they do not want their
proxy to be voted. See id. at *82.
191. The SEC noted that many commentators had objected that shareholders' state law
rights of access were inadequate because companies routinely "abuse shareholder rights by denying
requests on insubstantial grounds," forcing shareholders to litigate enforcement of their rights. Id.
at *61. The cost of a lawsuit may be sufficient to bar access to the list. See, for example, Robert
A.G. Monks, My Run for the Sears Board, Legal Times 20 (Aug. 12, 1991). Corporate commenta-
tors questioned the SEC's authority to adopt proposed amendments expanding shareholder state
law rights of access. Id.; Karmel, N.Y. L. J. 9 (Dec. 7, 1992 (cited in note 179)).
192. As Professor Bernard Black explains, Rule 14a-7 can best be described as a "non-ac-
cess" rule. "It doesn't obstruct shareholder action, but neither does it level the playing field...
Black, 17 J. Corp. L. at 57 (cited in note 6).
193. Previously -it was possible for management to "bundle" multiple issues together. This
practice allowed management to obtain shareholder ratification of measures that, if submitted sep-
arately, might have been defeated. Professor Jeffrey Gordon describes how bundling works. For
example, a proxy might require shareholders to cast a single vote for a package including both a
wealth-reducing proposal, such as an unfavorable amendment to the charter, and a "sweetener"
such as a dividend payment. Shareholders thus would be required to approve a provision that they
really did not want in order to obtain the sweetener. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual
Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 47-49 (1988). The
American Tobacco Company used increased dividends as sweeteners to obtain shareholder ap-
proval of its stock allotment compensation plans for executives. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
288 U.S. 123, 138 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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limited effect on the ability of management to engage in strategic be-
havior 4 because it does not prevent management from conditioning
approval of a proposal on the adoption of one or more other proposals.
Thus, management can still coerce shareholders into supporting an un-
favorable proposal by tying it to adoption of a proposal likely to garner
shareholder support.
The amendments are also significant for what they failed to do.
First, the SEC did not respond to CalPERS's request that the Commis-
sion mandate confidential voting.19 Second, the SEC did not consider
questions of ballot access; indeed, the SEC neither amended Rule 14a-8
nor addressed proposals regarding direct shareholder nomination of di-
rectors. 196 Third, the SEC did not provide for a universal proxy, which
would give shareholders access to a single document listing all candi-
dates for director positions and allow shareholders to vote their prefer-
ences without writing in names or comparing two or more separate lists.
Fourth, the amendments did not address any substantive limitations on
the role of shareholder voting, such as state law limitations on a share-
holder's right to put a corporate governance question to a vote. Finally,
the SEC did not address the potential chilling effect of Rule 13(d) on
collective action by shareholders in connection with voting.
VI. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SEC's PROXY RULES
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the SEC's proxy rules
are not passive attempts to implement shareholders' state law rights in
an increasingly large and impersonal voting system. Instead, the rules
change the voting process, both by determining issues upon which
shareholder democracy is appropriate and by structuring the way in
which such democracy can be exercised. The proxy rules' substantive
impact on shareholder voting, a subject traditionally relegated to state
corporation law, distinguishes them from much of the system of federal
securities regulation, which focuses primarily on disclosure.
The dominance of state law with respect to shareholder voting
raises the question of whether the proxy rules are a legitimate exercise
of the SEC's rulemaking authority-ultimately a question of statutory
194. See Gordon, 76 Cal. L. Rev. at 47-55 (describing bundling and "chicken" as examples of
management strategic behavior).
195. See Minow, 17 J. Corp. L. at 152-53 (cited in note 6) (describing a confidential voting
proposal).
196. See, for example, id. at 153 n.11 (describing proposals by NL Industries, Inc., and
United Shareholders' Association for direct nomination of directors).
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interpretation. 19 7 The broad language of Section 14(a)19 ' makes it diffi-
cult to derive limitations on the SEC's power from an examination of
the text of the rule. Nonetheless, such limitations do exist. An adminis-
trative agency can act only under "specific, well-defined grants of
power."199 "Neither pursuit of the public interest nor the 'broad pur-
pose' of a statute can support a rule not justified by the statutory lan-
guage .... 12200
As the Supreme Court has explained: "The rulemaking power
granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of
a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is 'the power
to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as ex-
pressed by the statute.' "1201 The Court has further explained that courts
are to determine the will of Congress by examining the language and
legislative history of the authorizing legislation.0 2
Although many commentators have debated the merits of the
SEC's proxy regulations, 0 8 they have rarely questioned the SEC's au-
thority to promulgate the rules.2 4 In evaluating recent criticisms of the
proxy rules, including criticism of the most recent amendments, and
197. The SEC, as an administrative agency, can only make rules within the scope of the
statutory authority delegated to it. See, for example, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 n.6 (1986) (holding that an administrative agency, in this
case the Federal Reserve Board, only has the power "to police within the boundaries of the Act"
and not "to expand its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries established by Congress").
198. Section 14(a) simply authorizes the SEC to make such rules as are "necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Section 14(a) (cited in note 46).
199. George W. Dent, Jr., Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 725, 727 (1986).
200. Id.
201. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (citations omitted).
202. See id. at 214 (looking at the language and legislative history of the Exchange Act to
determine the scope of the SEC rulemaking authority under § 10(b)). The Court seemingly has
authorized the use of both dominant theoretical approaches to statutory interpretation: the textu-
alist approach and the legislative history approach. For a detailed analysis of the extent to which
the Supreme Court actually utilizes various theories of statutory interpretation in deciding cases,
see Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1073 (1992). But compare Zeppos, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1295 (cited in note 10)
(criticizing both textualist and legislative history methods and proposing an alternative fact-find-
ing model of interpretation).
203. See note 6. Most criticism is directed to the merits of the proxy rules. See, for example,
Manne, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 481 (cited in note 6) (arguing against allowing shareholder social-action
proposals). Several commentators have questioned whether the proxy rules are desirable. See, for
example, Dent, 30 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 6) (arguing that Rule 14a-8 wastes corpo-
rate resources and should be rescinded); Liebeler, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 425 (cited in note 5) (same).
204. Two recent commentators have analyzed the legislative history of § 14 to evaluate the
legitimacy of the proxy rules. See Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 97 (cited in note 6) (concluding that even
though the rules are substantive, they are consistent with congressional intent); Bainbridge, 1992
Wis. L. Rev. 1071 (cited in note 6) (concluding that the rules should be limited to disclosure and
procedural issues).
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determining whether further reform of the proxy rules is necessary, the
legitimacy of the rules remains unresolved. Moreover, a recent decision
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia provides a fresh
basis for questioning the SEC's authority to promulgate the existing
rules.
A. The Business Roundtable Decision
The Business Roundtable v. SEC"5 concerned Rule 19c-4,206 which
prohibits national securities exchanges and national securities organiza-
tions from listing the stock of any corporation that "disenfranchised"
its shareholders. 07 The Rule had the effect of limiting the ability of a
listed corporation to modify or reduce the voting rights of common
shareholders from a one share-one vote structure.
The Business Roundtable claimed that the SEC lacked the statu-
tory authority to promulgate Rule 19c-4. In defense of the Rule, the
SEC argued that one source of its authority was Section 14 of the Ex-
change Act, which authorized the SEC to make rules for the purpose of
promoting fair corporate suffrage. 0 8 The court reviewed the legislative
history and purposes of the Exchange Act and concluded that the
SEC's rulemaking authority under Section 14 could not be construed so
broadly.2 9
According to the court, Congress authorized the SEC to regulate
the proxy process primarily to ensure that shareholders could exercise
their votes on an informed basis. Although the court acknowledged the
SEC's authorization to enact regulations to promote "fair corporate suf-
frage," the court stated that Congress intended the regulations to bear
"almost exclusively on disclosure" as the means of promoting fair
suffrage.210
The court analyzed the operation of Rule 19c-4 and concluded that
the rule regulated the distribution of voting power in a corporation.2 11
This regulation, said the court, directly interfered with corporate vot-
ing, control of which Congress had left to state law.212 The court said
that Section 14(a) did not authorize the SEC to decide which issues
205. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
206. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990). The SEC adopted the Rule on July 7, 1988, in connection
with its supervision of self-regulatory organizations such as stock exchanges.
207. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407.
208. Id. at 410.
209. See id. (reviewing the legislative history to determine the legislative purpose of the Ex-
change Act and refusing to accept a broad generalization of congressional purpose, such as improv-
ing the operation of the capital markets).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 411.
212. Id. at 411-12.
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should be subject to a shareholder vote or to interfere with traditional
state law issues such as quorum requirements, independent directors,
and shareholder approval for major corporate transactions.21 3 It found
no principled way to distinguish regulation of these issues from the
SEC's one share-one vote rule; all were consistent with the goal of pro-
moting fair corporate suffrage. 14 The court concluded that the SEC
had exceeded its authority and impermissibly attempted to federalize
corporate governance standards by "step[ping] beyond control of voting
procedure and into the distribution of voting power .... "215
Business Roundtable did not directly address the legitimacy of the
proxy rules. In reviewing the objectives of proxy regulation and the ex-
tent to which the SEC can affect corporate governance in the name of
fair corporate suffrage, however, the court raised significant questions
concerning the SEC's regulation of ballot access. In particular, the court
observed that Rule 19c-4, like many of the proxy rules, was based on
SEC concerns that disclosure and procedural requirements might not
remedy all the problems of the shareholder voting process.' 16 The court
warned that Congress did not seek, through Section 14(a) or elsewhere
in the federal securities laws, to regulate shareholders' choices. If the
SEC was concerned about the substantive efficacy of shareholder vot-
ing, the court advised it to "turn to Congress.M17
B. The Legislative History of Section 14(a)
Is Business Roundtable correct in finding that the objectives of
Congress in enacting Section 14(a) were limited to furthering disclosure
in connection with the proxy process? If so, the decision seems to com-
pel the conclusion that the proxy rules, which affect substantive voting
rights, are illegitimate.2 18 Or does the legislative history support the
contrary conclusion that the SEC has not taken advantage of the full
extent of its congressional authorization to promote fair corporate
suffrage?21
9
213. Id. at 412.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 411.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. This is the position taken by Professor Stephen Bainbridge. Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L.
Rev. at 1111 (cited in note 6).
219. Professor Patrick Ryan explains that although the proxy rules substantively affect cor-
porate governance, they are consistent with congressional intent. See Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 140,
146 (cited in note 6) (arguing that the legislative history indicates that Congress anticipated and
intended that the proposed system of proxy regulation would significantly change the manage-
ment-shareholder balance of power by increasing shareholder participation in corporate
governance).
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This Article disagrees with both views of the legislative history. Al-
though the legislative history demonstrates a congressional concern
with disclosure, it also shows that the drafters of the Exchange Act
hoped to reform the management of business corporations. Increased
shareholder participation in corporate governance represented one
mechanism for achieving this reform. It is unclear, however, whether
the legislation adopted by Congress retained that objective. The dearth
of clear evidence regarding Congress's objectives in enacting Section
14(a) makes reliance on legislative history as a basis for evaluating the
legitimacy of the proxy rules impossible. The following Part of this Ar-
ticle instead suggests that history represents but one part of a more
dynamic interpretive model.22 0
1. The Argument that Section 14(a) Is Limited to Disclosure
Recognition that the regulation of proxies comprised a relatively
minor component of the Securities Exchange Act provides a starting
point in analyzing the legislative intent behind Section 14(a). Although
the statute authorizes the SEC to make rules to regulate the solicitation
of proxies and the legislative history, including the committee reports,
floor debate, and hearings, contains references to shareholder voting, 2 1
the statute did not focus primarily on the proxy rules.
220. Statutory interpretation is a central element of federal securities law. Although major
advances have been made in analyzing issues of statutory interpretation, see, for example, Zeppos,
76 Va. L. Rev. 1295 (cited in note 10); Eskridge, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (cited in note 14); Frickey,
77 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (cited in note 9), these advances have rarely been used to examine the inter-
pretation of the federal securities laws.
221. The record reflecting the legislative history of the Exchange Act includes prior versions
of the legislation, transcripts of the hearings held by the Committee on Stock Exchange Practices,
transcripts of the floor debate on the legislation, and various committee reports. The House and
Senate bills are reprinted in volumes 10 and 11, respectively, of Jack. S. Ellenberger and Ellen P.
Mahar, comps., Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (F.B. Rothman, 1973) (11 vols.) ("Legislative History"). The congressional committees
charged with studying stock exchange legislation, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
and the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, held hearings to consider the
proposed bills from February to April of 1934. The Senate hearing transcripts ("Senate Hearings")
are reprinted in volumes 6 and 7 of Legislative History, and the House hearings ("House Hear-
ings") are reprinted in volumes 8 and 9. The floor debate is reprinted in 4 Legislative History. The
congressional reports prepared in connection with the 1934 Act are reprinted in 5 Legislative His-
tory. For a detailed description of the sources of legislative history available on the 1934 Act and
an evaluation of their significance, see Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 130-43 (cited in note 6). See also
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliabil-
ity of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 Duke L.
J. 39 (questioning the value of traditional "sources" of legislative history as probative of congres-
sional intent). For a deeper look at the political evolution of the Exchange Act and the individuals
responsible for drafting the statute, see Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 Hastings L. J. 391, 457-83 (1991). See also Seligman,
The Transformation of Wall Street at 73-100 (cited in note 43).
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Rather, the main congressional concerns-and the issues generat-
ing the most controversy-were regulating margin transactions, freeing
stock exchanges from the effect of pools and other manipulative de-
vices, and instituting a system of securities disclosure that would pro-'
vide information to investors both in connection with their initial
purchase and on an ongoing basis.2 2 Congress adopted a system that
addressed many perceived abuses in the securities market through dis-
closure, a device viewed both as a desirable end in itself and as a means
of deterring fraud.22 8
During the drafting process, Congress paid less attention to the
federal regulation of proxy voting. The few extended references to this
section of the bill referred almost exclusively to problems raised by
early drafts of the legislation, which had mandated specific disclosure
requirements. In its original form, Section 14(a) required anyone solicit-
ing proxies to disclose: (1) the purpose of the solicitation; (2) any rela-
tionship the solicitor had with the issuer; (3) any interest the solicitor
possessed in the subject security; (4) persons from whom similar proxies
were being solicited; and (5) such further information as the SEC might
require.
Many objections were raised to this form of the provision, particu-
larly to the required disclosure of other shareholders from whom prox-
ies were being solicited.2 4 Industry experts noted that this requirement
was tantamount to requiring an issuer, during a routine proxy solicita-
tion, to send a complete shareholder list to each shareholder. 2 5 They,
testified that this requirement was unduly burdensome and would im-
222. See Senate Hearings at 6466 (cited in note 221) (statement of Thomas Corcoran)
(describing regulation in four general fields: (1) control of'credit; (2) manipulation and evils in
stock market machinery; (3) protection of investors in the market "from ignorance and from ex-
ploitation by corporate insiders;" and (4) over-the-counter or unlisted regulation). Compare re-
marks by Senator Duncan U. Fletcher to the U.S. Senate upon introduction of S. 2693, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. in 78 Cong. Rec. 2270-71 (Feb. 9, 1934) (describing the purposes of the bill as addressing
manipulation, regulation of credit, disclosure by issuers, and a variety of other "misleading and
law-avoiding devices" including "the abuse of proxies"). See also Report on Stock Exchange Prac-
tices, S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (describing the result of congressional investiga-
tion and the objectives of regulation).
223. See Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1109-10 (cited in note 6) (describing the objectives
of the disclosure system).
224. These objections were made even though Thomas Corcoran, one of the draftsmen of the
provision, justified § 14(a) in terms of protecting shareholders from management abuse of control
of the proxy process. As Corcoran explained, this provision "prevents the great mass of unorgan-
ized stockholders and bondholders from being at the mercy of a management which controls the
lists of those to whom proxy solicitations can be sent." House Hearings at 138-42 (cited in note
221) (statement of Thomas Corcoran).
225. See, for example, House Hearings at 224-25 (written statement by Richard Whitney,
President of the New York Stock Exchange) (observing that the proxy provisions will require an
issuer to send each shareholder a complete shareholders' list as part of every proxy solicitation).
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pose unnecessary printing and mailing costs upon corporations. 226 Tes-
timony at the Senate hearings also suggested that the provision would
lead to misuse of shareholder lists.227 Finally, witnesses criticized the
requirement as superfluous, noting that state law provided a procedure
for disclosure of shareholder lists.
Many of those testifying before the congressional committees re-
minded the committee members that the proxy solicitation process had
developed to enable shareholder voting to continue in national corpora-
tions that would be unable to hold annual meetings and to meet state
law quorum requirements if personal attendance were required. Wit-
nesses warned that if Congress imposed stringent requirements on the
proxy solicitation process, corporations would be paralyzed.28 At least
one witness threatened that the proposed proxy regulation would have
the untoward effect of maintaining existing management in office
against the will of the shareholders because, under state law, the previ-
ous board would remain in office if a corporation did not obtain a quo-
rum sufficient to elect a new board.229
226. See House Hearings at 261 (statement of Eugene E. Thompson, President of Associated
Stock Exchanges) (describing the "enormous expense burden" imposed on corporations by the
requirement that they send a list of all shareholders to every shareholder before soliciting proxies);
House Hearings at 427 (statement of R. V. Fletcher, General Counsel to Association of Railway
Executives) (criticizing a proposal, requiring corporations to send a shareholder list to all share-
holders in connection with a proxy solicitation and describing a printed list of the shareholders of
the Pennsylvania Railroad as "a book as big as the family Bible, almost"); House Hearings at 527
(statement of Representative Wadsworth) (citing a letter from Walter S. Gifford, President of
American Telephone & Telegraph Company, which describes the AT&T shareholder list as "three
volumes as large as the Washington Telephone Directory," which would cost the company $950,000
to distribute to all shareholders); House Hearings at 666 (letter from The Merchants' Association
of New York) (recommending elimination of the requirement of printing and distributing a share-
holder list in connection with the distribution of proxies as "a considerable item of expense with-
out compensating advantage in a great majority of cases").
227. See, for example, Senate Hearings at 7169 (cited in note 221) (statement by Arthur W.
Sewall, President of General Asphalt Company) (criticizing the cost of mailing shareholder lists
and warning of the risk that lists "would fall into the hands of unscrupulous persons who might
use them for an endless number of extraneous and even nefarious purposes"); Senate Hearings at
7265 (written statement submitted by Sidney Blumenthal, chairman of Sidney Blumenthal &
Company, Inc.) (warning that distribution of shareholder names would "permit abuse by those
who have a mischievous purpose" such as the distribution of "propaganda based on irresponsible
statements, innuendoes and a spreading of questionable information").
228. Senate Hearings at 6896 (cited in note 221) (statement of Richard G. Babbage of the
Real Estate Board of New York) (stating that "[i]t is elementary that the purposes of the meeting
are stated in the notice of meeting and that the proxies should enable persons holding them to
vote for any question that can legally be brought before the meeting. It is necessary in order to
obtain a quorum that some system of obtaining proxies should be adopted.").
229. See House Hearings at 494 (cited in note 221) (memorandum submitted by John M.
Hancock, member of Lehman Brothers) (describing the cost of shareholder lists and the difficulty
of securing sufficient proxies for a quorum). Mr. Hancock warned that if the Commission's regula-
tions made it difficult to secure proxies, "[t]he result will be that no meetings can be held. Under
the existing law if there is no meeting of shareholders to elect directors the present directors con-
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The committees first attempted to deal with these concerns by
modifying the distribution requirement so that corporations would only
be required to file a shareholder list with the commission instead of
being forced to mail one to each shareholder who was solicited.230 This
modification appeared to address most of the concerns raised by wit-
nesses before the congressional committees and still permitted share-
holders access to the list. Some critics, however, maintained that the
list might be used improperly or, worse, that the filing requirement
would unduly burden individual shareholders who wished to solicit
proxies. 23'
Congress ultimately decided not to resolve the issue, leaving the
SEC to develop disclosure requirements in connection with the solicita-
tion of proxies. 32 This method of resolution was consistent with the
eventual congressional approach to the federal securities laws, which
forswore detailed statutory provisions in favor of allowing an industry-
specific agency to develop, through its expertise and experience, regula-
tions that would address the overall congressional objectives.33 Section
tinue in power. This point is cited because in the attempt to cover certain evils it seems quite
possible that the bill is creating a different kind of evil. Certainly there is nothing to be gained by
having management continue in power by default." Id.
230. Id. See Senate Hearings at 7054-55 (cited in note 221) (debating the efficacy of a re-
quirement that a shareholder list be filed with the Federal Trade Commission); Senate Hearings at
7148 (statement of Senator Fletcher) (arguing that shareholders should have access to the list of
fellow investors).
231. Senate Hearings at 7565-66 (statement by Roland L. Redmond, Attorney for the New
York Stock Exchange) (criticizing the section of the bill regulating the solicitation of proxies):
I am aware of the fact that this provision was put in with the idea that it would facilitate
minority stockholders getting in touch with each other in a possible contest for control, but,
quite frankly, I think it is going to operate almost the other way around, because under this
provision the first thing that a minority stockholder would have to do before he could solicit
the other stockholders would be to get a complete list from the company and file it with the
Federal Trade Commission, and the expense that would be imposed upon the minority stock-
holders by that provision might be so great as to prevent the soliciting of any proxies. Quite
frankly, we feel that this provision has no part in a stock-exchange bill.
Id.
232. Interestingly, after the SEC promulgated its first regulations under § 14, a large number
of corporations resisted the application of the regulations by refusing to solicit proxies from their
shareholders in connection with annual meetings. From October 1, 1938, to April 1, 1939, approxi-
mately 70 New York Stock Exchange companies (nearly 10% of the then-listed companies)
adopted the policy of not soliciting proxies. The boycott of the proxy regulations seemed to verify
the concern that regulating the solicitation process in the name of shareholder protection could
backfire. See Dean, 24 Cornell L. Q. at 487 n.8 (cited in note 6).
233. See House Debate, 78 Cong. Rec. at 7923 (cited in note 133) (statement of Representa-
tive Mapes) (describing the House Committee's decision to change the method of proxy regulation.
from the "definite" and "stringent" requirements of the original bill to a provision that simply
"clothes the Federal Trade Commission with very broad discretionary powers"). Compare House
Debate, 78 Cong. Rec. at 7929 (statement of Representative Cooper) (objecting to the broad discre-
tion given by the statute to the Federal Trade Commission to "set up any rule or regulation that it
desires regarding the solicitation of proxies" and commenting that "[t]his section ... shows the
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14(a), as adopted, simply makes it unlawful to solicit proxies in contra-
vention of the SEC rules. 23
4
Apart from the debate over the shareholder list, the legislative his-
tory materials contain only a few references to proxy regulation. The
most detailed discussion is contained in the Report on Stock Exchange
Practices (the "Fletcher Report").3 5 The Fletcher Report devotes ap-
proximately three pages of discussion to the regulation of proxies. 236 Ac-
cording to the Fletcher Report, the objective of proxy regulation is to
provide shareholders with greater information to assist them in the vot-
ing process-information about matters such as the financial condition
of the company, the major questions of policy to be decided at share-
holders' meetings, and the matters for which voting authority is sought
through the proxy.2s7
extent to which the bill goes in an endeavor to control the conduct of individuals in the moral and
everyday business activities of life"); House Debate, 78 Cong. Rec. at 7931 (statement of Represen-
tative Beedy) (warning that "[tlhis year the FTC might decide that one practice is correct, but
next year their point of view might change, and changed regulations vitally affecting all interests
concerned would seriously disturb business stabilization").
See also Senate Hearings at 7565-66 (cited in note 221) (statement of Roland L. Redmond)
(describing the reaction of the New York Stock Exchange to the general delegation of authority to
the FTC):
We do suggest, however, in the line that we have taken right straight through of making these
provisions flexible, that if any provision is retained it should be made simply to the effect that
it shall be unlawful to solicit ... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may adopt for the protection of investors. That, at least, would allow the Federal
Trade Commission to study the problem and to adopt rules and regulations, if it becomes
necessary.
Id. See also Senate Hearings at 7583 (memorandum submitted by George A. Lambell, Chairman of
Committee of Put and Call Brokers and Dealers in the City of New York) (recommending that the
proxy regulation section be amended simply to prohibit proxy solicitations in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt and proposing language virtually identi-
cal to that in the final statute).
234. The delegation of rulemaking authority to the SEC has been described as a political
compromise. Industry insiders believed that the newly created SEC would be more responsive than
Congress to their concerns about regulatory burdens. Accordingly, the broad delegation of author-
ity decreased their opposition to the Act. See Thel, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 456-60 (cited in note 43)
(discussing the compromise on regulation by the newly created SEC).
235. Report on Stock Exchange Practices, S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), re-
printed in 5 Legislative History, Item 21 (cited in note 221) ("Fletcher Report"). The Fletcher
Report, which was published by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in June 1934, is
a virtual treatise on the then-existing trading and operational practices in the securities and in-
vestment banking industries. The report contains both a summary of the problems revealed by the
congressional hearings and the manner in which the new federal securities legislation had been
drafted to address those problems.
236. Id. at 74-77.
237. The report stated, "In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to
the manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not only
as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of policy, which
are decided at stockholders' meetings. Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the
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This description in the Fletcher Report suggests that disclosure is
the threshold concern of federal proxy regulation. The state law right to
elect directors is meaningless unless the shareholders can evaluate the
performance of the current board, hence the requirement that the cor-
poration provide shareholders with information on the corporation's fi-
nancial condition in connection with the voting process. Shareholders
should also understand the nature of the authorization they are being
asked to provide in the proxy card. The Report describes a proxy solici-
tation by American Commercial Alcohol Corporation as an example of a
solicitation that fails to disclose to shareholders the nature of the trans-
action they are being asked to ratify. 38 Finally, the Fletcher Report
states that shareholders should be informed as to "major questions of
policy.2 39 This language is susceptible of two interpretations: (1) it may
suggest a role for shareholders as decisionmakers with respect to corpo-
rate policy, or (2) it may simply direct that shareholders receive infor-
mation about corporate policies and objectives in addition to operating
results.
The Fletcher Report explains that the SEC's rulemaking process
can meet the objectives of proxy regulation. It does not, however, artic-
ulate the nature of the rulemaking to be undertaken, apart from a di-
rection that the rules and regulations be designed to protect investors
from the abusive use of the proxy process, both by corporate insiders
and by third parties who thereby seek to obtain control of the com-
pany.24 0 The Report, therefore, does not conclusively answer the ques-
tion of whether the rules should be limited to disclosure requirements.
A second congressional report,241 the Rayburn Report,242 contains
some of the most frequently quoted language concerning regulation of
the voting process. In a section entitled "Control of Unfair Practices by
stockholder of the real nature of the matter for which authority to cast his vote is sought." Id. at
74.
238. Id. at 75.
239. Id. at 74.
240. Id. at 77.
241. The other two major congressional reports prepared in connection with the Exchange
Act do not illuminate the issue of proxy regulation. The final conference report, Conference Report
[To accompany H.R. 9323], H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), describes the reconcili-
ation of the final House and Senate draft bills, but does not address proxy regulation directly. Nor
is the Senate Report, Report [To accompany S. 3420], S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprinted in 5 Legislative History, Item 17 ("Senate Report"), worthy of independent analysis, as
it was drafted by Senator Fletcher and contains an abridged version of the Fletcher Report's dis-
cussion of proxies.
242. Report [To accompany H.R. 9323], H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprinted in 5 Legislative History, Item 18 (cited in note 221) ("Rayburn Report"). The Rayburn
Report was prepared by Congressman Rayburn to accompany a version of the bill similar in form
to the bill that Congress eventually enacted.
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Corporate Insiders," the Report states: "Fair corporate suffrage is an
important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a
public exchange. '243 The Report goes on to describe these unfair prac-
tices. The Report explains that corporate insiders can perpetuate them-
selves in office by soliciting proxies to secure their re-election without
disclosing to shareholders: (1) their interest in the corporation; (2) the
management policies they intend to pursue; and (3) the purposes for
which the proxies are to be used. Thus, although the language of the
Rayburn Report indicates a broad concern with fair voting practices,
the abuse articulated in the Report actually concerns disclosure.
Professor Stephen Bainbridge argues that the language of the
Fletcher and Rayburn Reports supports the Business Roundtable con-
clusion that Section 14(a) is limited to disclosure and that Congress did
not intend the SEC, in regulating the solicitation of proxies, to affect
the substantive voting rights of shareholders.244 Presumably recognizing
that the Reports provide scant evidence of congressional intent regard-
ing the regulation of shareholder voting, Professor Bainbridge further
argues that statutory silence is itself evidence that Congress did not
intend to regulate substantive aspects of shareholder voting. Congress
could, after all, have enacted substantive regulation if it wished to do
SO.245
Indeed, Congress could have been much more straightforward if it
intended the SEC to regulate substantive aspects of shareholder voting.
Congress instead authorized SEC rulemaking solely with regard to the
solicitation of proxies. Congress did not authorize the SEC to regulate
shareholder voting in general.
Why did Congress draft the statute this way? In 1934, Congress
was aware of substantive deficiencies in the voting process; a staffer at
the Federal Trade Commission had prepared a draft bill that would
have included federal regulation of issues such as cumulative voting,
voting trusts, and composition of the board of directors. 24' Moreover,
the separation of ownership and control in the large public corporation
and the inability of shareholders to affect the operations of their corpo-
rations just recently had been identified by Adolf Berle, a member of
the committee charged with developing the Stock Exchange legisla-
243. Id. at 13.
244. Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1112 (cited in note 6).
245. Id. at 1114-16.
246. For a more complete description of the draft bill and two different interpretations of its
significance, see Thel, 42 Hastings L. J. at 466-67 (cited in note 221); Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L. Rev.
at 1115 (cited in note 6).
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tion,2' 7 as a major problem in American business. 24 8 Why then did Con-
gress limit its regulation to the proxy process?
Substantive regulation of voting clearly would have affected the
balance of power between shareholders and management, as well as the
overall structure of corporate governance. It would have, in effect, dis-
placed at least part of state corporation law with federal standards. The
drafters of the federal securities laws in fact considered the adoption of
a federal corporation law.249 President Roosevelt himself viewed federal
securities regulation as an effort to redress problems caused by lax en-
forcement of state corporation law.2 50 Richard Whitney, President of
the New York Stock Exchange, suggested during the hearings that the
inadequacy of state corporation laws caused the abuses about which
Congress was concerned, and that a national incorporation law would
solve the problem.251
Congress's failure to adopt a federal corporation law may reflect, in
part, its perception that it lacked the power to do So. 2 5 2 Under contem-
porary theories of constitutional law, whether Congress could regulate
corporations directly was questionable.23 The constitutionality of the
247. Thel, 42 Hastings L. J. at 464.
248. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (cited in note 31).
249. See, for example, Report to Secretary of Commerce by the Committee on Stock Ex-
change Regulation at 4, reprinted as part of the Roper Report, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), in 5
Legislative History, Item 16 (cited in note 221) (recognizing that "perhaps the most effective way"
to deal with perceived abuses in securities markets is "by the requirement of Federal incorporation
for corporations engaged in interstate commerce").
250. Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 42 (cited in note 43).
251. Mr. Whitney stated: "The apparent purpose of these provisions is to correct the abuses
in corporate procedure which exist today because of the inadequacy of State laws. The remedy for
this situation is a national incorporation law applicable to all companies doing business in inter-
state commerce. This should be accomplished by direct Federal legislation." Senate Hearings at
6583 (cited in note 221).
252. Indeed, in his opening testimony before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, James Landis, the draftsman of the 1934 Act, stated, "At the threshold of this ques-
tion, there seems to me to lie the question of national power over the exchanges. I think this
committee has to meet that and face that before it can go any further. The question is not free
from doubt." House Hearings at 16 (cited in note 221) (emphasis added).
253. See Thel, 42 Hastings L. J. at 457 (cited in note 221) (describing the constitutional
debate). One of the most comprehensive treatments of the subject is a monograph dated Dec. 18,
1933, by Raoul E. Desvernine, Edward McGarvey, and Jackson S. Hutto, The Extent of Federal
Power To Regulate Stock Exchanges and Stock Exchange Firms ("Extent of Federal Power')
(available at the U. of Va. law library), which was apparently prepared during the drafting process.
The study analyzes congressional power to regulate the stock exchanges under the Commerce
Clause, the taxing authority, congressional authority over the mails and telephones, power over the
banking industry, and power to regulate in connection with national emergencies. The study con-
cludes that none of the foregoing theories provides a basis for regulation of the stock exchanges. As
the authors state, "The only power under which Congress might exercise direct control over stock
exchanges or stock exchange firms would probably be the power under the commerce clause, and
the existence of any such right would be extremely doubtful." Id. at 68.
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Exchange Act was vehemently challenged during the drafting pro-
cess, 2 4 although the Act's sponsors eventually prevailed by defending
the regulation based on congressional power over interstate com-
merce.2 55 The concern about constitutional limitations on congressional
power may explain the absence of language authorizing substantive reg-
ulation of voting; the drafters perhaps omitted such language either be-
cause they felt constrained in their ability to regulate corporate affairs
directly or because they felt such language would unduly subject the
statute to constitutional challenge.
In enacting the Exchange Act, Congress may have been responding
to public concerns that the federal securities laws were intruding too
deeply into the internal governance of the corporation. Congress was
widely criticized for going overboard in response to stock exchange
abuses by attempting to regulate internal corporate affairs. Critics
viewed this as an improper attempt by Congress to interfere with pri-
vate industry and warned that President Roosevelt's "brain-trusters"
who drafted the statute were trying to "crack down" on big business.25
Congress responded to this criticism by minimizing the degree to
which the statute imposed substantive requirements other than disclo-
sure on corporations. The legislative history is replete with statements
disavowing an intention to affect management of corporate internal af-
fairs.257 The Senate bill contained explicit language that persisted until
254. See House Hearings at 518-23 (cited in note 221) (discussion between John Dickinson,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and Congressman Huddleston) (discussing the constitutionality
of the Exchange Act under the Commerce Clause); Brief on Behalf of New York Stock Exchange
Upon the Constitutionality of S. 2693 and H.R. 7852, reprinted in House Hearings at 562-71 (argu-
ing that the bills are unconstitutional); House Debate, 78 Cong. Rec. at 7920 (cited in note 133)
(statement by Congressman Frear) (arguing that the proposed bill presents an issue of constitu-
tionality that will have to be submitted to the Supreme Court). The New York Stock Exchange
introduced a memorandum that James Landis, one of the primary drafters of the Exchange Act,
had written while at Harvard Law School in support of its argument that the statute was unconsti-
tutional. See Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 91 (cited in note 43).
255. See, for example, House Hearings at 16-20 (statement of James Landis) (justifying regu-
lation based on Congress's power over interstate commerce); Memorandum Submitted by Noel T.
Dowling, Concerning the Power of Congress, Under the Commerce Clause, To Regulate Security
Exchanges, reprinted in House Hearings at 917-39 (analyzing the scope of congressional power to
regulate stock exchanges under the Commerce Clause).
256. See, for example, Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 96 (cited in note 43);
Thel, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 434-35 (cited in note 43). One witness at the House hearings warned that
government control of business would establish a "planned economy" and push the country "along
the road from Democracy to Communism." House Hearings at 759-73 (cited in note 221) (state-
ment of James H. Rand, Jr.). See also Senate Hearings at 6584 (cited in note 221) (statement of
Richard Whitney) (warning that the Exchange Act would effect "a form of nationalization of busi-
ness and industry"); Desvernine, et al., Extent of Federal Power at 8-9 (cited in note 253) (warning
that legislative regulation of the stock exchanges might, because of its intrusion on business prac-
tices, "be more detrimental to the common good than the evils sought to be corrected").
257. See, for example, Senate Report at 10 (cited in note 241) (disclaiming any intention "to
invest a governmental commission with the power to interfere in the management of corporations"
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the final conference draft stating that "nothing in this title shall be con-
strued as authorizing the Commission to interfere with the management
of the affairs of an issuer. 25 8 Legislators, however, deleted this lan-
guage in conference as unnecessary. 259 This history suggests a deliberate
refusal on the part of Congress to enact substantive legislation affecting
corporate governance. It is consistent with the view that Congress in-
tended to limit the federal securities laws to disclosure and chose to
defer the issue of a federal corporation law for a later day.8 °
Post hoc reviews of the legislative history and drafting of the stat-
ute also support this characterization. 261 For example, in the 1943
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce hearings on the
SEC proxy rules, Congressman Wolverton, who had been a member of
the Committee during the drafting and adoption of the 1934 Act, de-
scribed his understanding of the legislative purpose as follows:
Well, my whole thought with reference to the act and what power the Commis-
sion can exercise, is based very largely on the theory that the act was intended to
be one of disclosure and to protect the rights of investors by full disclosure. If you
could go back to the hearings that were held when the original act was before the
committee for consideration, I think you would find that the proponents of that
legislation were very definitely of the opinion that the act was not intended, nor
and arguing that "the bill furnishes no justification for such an interpretation"); Senate Debate on
S. 3420, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (April 20, 1934), in 78 Cong. Rec. 8505 (1934), reprinted in 4 Legisla-
tive History (statement by Mr. Reynolds) (stating that "[t]he authors of the bill evidently have
recognized the fact that the commission is to have no right whatsoever to interfere with the man-
agement of any corporation").
258. S. 3420, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(d) (April 20, 1934). See Senate Debate, 78 Cong. Rec.
8505 (1934) (statement by Mr. Reynolds) (stating in reference to § 13(d) that "nothing in this act
shall be construed as authorizing the Commission to interfere with the management of the affairs
of an issuer"); (statement by Mr. Barkley) (observing that § 13(d) "was put in the bill by the
committee in order to allay the fears of business men and corporations that the Government was
to be authorized to manage their business" and remarking about the "great deal of difference
between managing the business of a corporation and requiring information to be filed in a public
place").
259. Conference Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934), in 78 Cong. Rec. 10,262 (1934)
(acknowledging that "[t]he House bill does not contain a provision corresponding to that con-
tained in subsection (d) of section 13 of the Senate amendment .... This provision is omitted from
the substitute as unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is open to misconstruction in
this respect.").
260. See Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street at 205-10 (cited in note 43) (describ-
ing enactment of a statute regulating corporate governance as the "chief unfinished business in the
Roosevelt administration's program of federal corporations law" and explaining the process by
which this program was eventually abandoned).
261. See, for example, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (stating
that the Exchange Act is primarily concerned with full disclosure; substantive fairness of translic-
tions is "at most a tangential concern"); J. L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (finding
that the "purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation") (emphasis
added).
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would it have, an interference other than that based on disclosure. I remember very
distinctly the hearings ....
Now, when we come down to an interpretation of that language in section 14
by the Commission, it seems to me that the Commission in many particulars in the
rules that it has adopted has gone beyond that disclosure theory and has taken
upon itself a sort of guardianship of the rights of a stockholder.
I am not condemning the desire to protect the stockholder, but I am condemn-
ing an interpretation that was not intended by Congress in the passage of the
act.2
6 2
This statement alone, of course, does not prove that Congress in-
tended to limit the SEC's rulemaking authority under Section 14(a) to
making rules compelling disclosure. 63 Representative Wolverton's re-
marks merely demonstrate that the statute and legislative history are
ambiguous.""4 Although some members of Congress and some partici-
pants in the hearings likely supported more extensive involvement ei-
ther by Congress or the Commission in the regulation of shareholder
voting rights, the legislative history does not reveal a consensus
position.
How did the record become so muddled just nine years after the
enactment of the Exchange Act? Representative Wolverton's statement
suggests that the foregoing review of legislative history is incomplete,
and that at least some support exists in the record for a broader view of
Congress's delegation of rulemaking authority to the SEC.
2. The Argument Against the Disclosure Model
Although both the Fletcher and Rayburn Reports demonstrate a
regulatory concern with disclosure that is consistent with the regulatory
structure of the federal securities laws in general, do the Reports indi-
cate congressional intent to regulate beyond disclosure?26 5 The Rayburn
Report in particular contains a broad reference to "fair corporate suf-
frage. 12 e Does the use of that language suggest an intention on the part
of Congress to inject goals of substantive fairness into the voting pro-
cess beyond insuring the ability of a shareholder to exercise state law
voting rights in an informed manner?
262. Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules, Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821,
and H.R. 2019 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 236-37 (1943) (statement by Mr. Wolverton) (emphasis added) ("1943 Hearings").
263. See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411 and sources cited therein.
264. Representative Wolverton stated: "Section 14 has evidently created some uncertainty or
doubt as to just what was intended by the language that was used." 1943 Hearings (cited in note
262).
. 265. Professor Patrick Ryan identifies "nascent images" of shareholder monitoring and deci-
sionmaking in the reports and argues that they support the view that Congress intended proxy
regulation to further shareholder participation in corporate governance. Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at
140-41 (cited in note 6).
266. See notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
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Unfortunately, neither the Reports nor the Congressional debate
answer the question. Even if Congress intended to authorize the SEC to
address questions of substantive fairness, the Reports do not indicate
what Congress meant by "fair." The argument that Congress intended
the Exchange Act to regulate more than disclosure is bolstered, how-
ever, by examining more closely the problems to which the Act was ad-
dressed and the concerns raised during the hearings about insider
domination of corporate decisionmaking.
For example, Thomas Corcoran, one of the principal drafters of the
Exchange Act, had a broad view of the problems to which the proxy
regulation was addressed. Corcoran believed that corporate insiders,
through their control of the proxy process, were able both to perpetuate
themselves in power and to use the voting process to further their pri-
vate ends.267 He viewed the abuse of power by corporate insiders as cen-
tral to the objectives of federal regulation, explaining:
It is one of the big worries about the corporate form of doing business in this coun-
try, that the shareholders, nor really even the boards of directors do not actually
run corporations, but coterie of a very few men on the inside.... You are tied up,
sir, with a problem so big that this proxy solicitation touches only one edge of it.2 68
Other scattered references in the hearing transcripts describe the
need for more active shareholder participation in corporate governance
to redress the abuses perpetrated by insider dominance. 269 The refer-
ences demonstrate that, in developing the Exchange Act, Congress was
concerned about the abuses perpetuated by corporate insiders, through
the proxy process and otherwise. 270 Regulation of the proxy process pro-
vided a partial solution to this concern about management overreach-
ing. 1 Significantly, this concern was shared both by those who
supported Section 14(a) and those who criticized the provision as
drafted.7 2 In other words, there was a widely held sentiment in Con-
267. House Hearings at 138-42 (cited in note 221) (statement of Thomas Corcoran).
268. Id.
269. See Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 141-42 (cited in note 6) (noting references in the hearing
transcripts supporting the ideal of active and informed shareholders).
270. At the time of the hearings, the separation of ownership and control in the public corpo-
ration had been widely recognized as diminishing the ability of shareholders to monitor and to
restrain management conduct. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner C. Means had published the semi-
nal work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (CCH, 1932), and members of Congress
were familiar with the concerns it raised about management control of business decisionmaking.
271. See John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC, 29 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 250-52 (1991)
(describing congressional concern about investor protection as motivating the proxy regulation
mechanism).
272. Indeed, some commentators criticized the legislation as not going far enough and called
for a statute that would empower the shareholder more explicitly. See, for example, House Hear-
ings at 6545 (cited in note 221) (statement by Senator Kean) (suggesting that the Exchange Act
should "be drawn a little more in favor of the stockholder who wishes to protest against the man-
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gress that corporate insiders were allowed to perpetuate themselves as
management and reap other personal advantages through misuse of the
voting process. Moreover, Congress generally perceived that increased
empowerment and participation by shareholders would ameliorate this
problem."'
Can one conclude from these indications of congressional concern
with shareholder democracy that Congress intended Section 14(a) to
confer substantive rulemaking authority on the SEC to enhance share-
holder monitoring and decisionmaking? The scattered references in the
legislative history to the need for shareholder democracy to remedy in-
sider abuse do not establish this intention. Indeed, a diligent researcher
can find support for virtually anything within the thousands of state-
ments contained in the legislative history of the Exchange Act.2 74 In
light of the many explicit statements to the contrary, one cannot infer
that such references demonstrate legislative intent.
Additional arguments can be made in favor of an expansive view of
the Exchange Act.2 75 Perhaps the strongest argument is that the broad
agement of the company, rather than the way it is now drawn"). The most extensive statement on
this point was made by witness Samuel Untermyer:
I respectfully submit that the provisions of [section 13(a)], they are the opposite of what
they should be. The ability of security holders to join for their mutual protection against the
management of corporations that are now largely controlled by those with no substantial fi-
nancial interest in the corporation and to communicate freely with one another to that end
and to protect one another should be encouraged rather than discouraged or made difficult.
Why should it be considered necessary or desirable in the public interest in the solicita-
tion of proxies to continue or dislodge an existing management. . . . [A]s it now stands, any-
body who wants to contest corporate control instead of being encouraged to do so and to have
his voice heard, has got to go before the Commission and make a disclosure to the Commis-
sion and get the consent of the Commission to deal with his own property .... My suggestion
is to facilitate the assertion of the rights of stockholders who are not controlled by the man-
agement, to give them a chance to come into their own.
House Hearings at 7711-17. The concern Untermyer expressed was also raised in the Senate de-
bate on the bill. Senator Steiwer stated:
There is much to be said about the section requiring proxies. If I had my way, I would
either change that section or eliminate it from the bill. The committee was told by men who
are experts upon this subject, men like Mr. Untermyer, who, through busy lifetimes, have
been endeavoring to protect the interest of stockholders in great corporations, that this proxy
requirement will not help the minority groups; that it will not aid the weak or defenseless; but
that probably it will aid those in power, those who control the corporation; that it will operate
differently than was contemplated by the committee.
Senate Debate, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., in 78 Cong. Rec. 8279 (1934) (statement by Senator Steiwer).
273. See Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 142-43 (cited in note 6) (describing congressional observa-
tions about shareholder democracy as a remedy for insider abuses). Even Professor Bainbridge
admits that the hearings contain passages indicating a broader congressional concern than disclo-
sure. Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1112-13 (cited in note 6).
274. Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1113 n.190.
275. One argument is that other provisions of the Exchange Act contradict the Business
Roundtable reading of the Act as disclosure-oriented. For example, Professor Thel has described
§ 16 of the Exchange Act as reflecting congressional intent to influence corporate governance in a
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Congressional delegations of power to the SEC were specifically
designed to permit broader substantive regulation without raising the
political and constitutional concerns that explicit substantive rules
would have sparked. In other words, as Professor Thel has suggested,
the drafters "may have been trying to hide their agenda. 2 7 6 If the
drafters believed they were empowering the Commission with the au-
thority to redistribute corporate power, little advantage could be gained
by advertising that fact in light of the substantial political resistance to
that policy. 77 Under this reading, congressional silence on substantive
matters need not be read as a failure to act.7
In addition, although Congress remained silent with respect to the
scope of the authority delegated, it made no affirmative attempt to con-
strain the SEC.27 9 Congress certainly could have phrased the statutory
mandate to require those soliciting proxies to "make such disclosure as
the SEC shall require." If Congress intended the SEC merely to work
out a series of disclosure provisions, its grant of rulemaking authority
could have been worded much more narrowly. Under this reading, Pro-
fessor Bainbridge's argument about Congress's failure to be more ex-
plicit proves too much.
Finally, it is possible that current views of congressional intent in
enacting the Exchange Act have been colored by the nature of its pred-
ecessor statute, the Securities Act of 1933. Little question remains
about the disclosure-oriented nature of the Securities Act. At least one
commentator has observed that by enacting this statute first, Congress
substantive way. See Thel, 42 Hastings L. J. 391 (cited in note 221). Professor Thel suggests that
§ 16 is designed to regulate management decisionmaking and to render it more efficient and more
consistent with the interests of investors and the general public. To the extent that it is correct,
this reading of § 16 contradicts the argument that the objectives of the federal securities laws are
limited to disclosure.
276. Id. at 483.
277. See Comment, 33 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 922 (cited in note 28) (reading § 14(a) as providing
broad delegation to the SEC to regulate certain aspects of corporate management but acknowledg-
ing that both the breadth and general nature of this delegation present constitutional questions).
278. This position is directly contrary to Professor Bainbridge's reading of congressional si-
lence. See Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1114-16 (cited in note 6) (arguing that congressional
silence indicated a decision against substantive regulation of voting rights).
279. Indeed, the delegation subsequently, albeit unsuccessfully, was attacked as unconstitu-
tionally broad. SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956). See also Legislation, Delegation of Power
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 974, 991 (1936) (arguing that dele-
gation of power to the SEC under § 14(a) is unique because it pertains to a practice "not closely
related to trading on the exchange" and that the delegation is therefore overbroad). The article
observes, however, that "[t]he abuses which have grown up in connection with the proxy machin-
ery are probably sufficiently notorious to convince a sympathetic tribunal that an adequate stan-
dard may be evolved with reference to it." Id. (footnote omitted).
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may have influenced scholars to characterize all future federal securities
legislation as disclosure-oriented. 8
3. The Legislative History as a Source of Regulatory Theory
The foregoing analysis does little to establish clear congressional
direction to the SEC to engage in substantive rulemaking. These state-
ments suggest, however, that the legislative history is not as free from
doubt as the Business Roundtable court states."8 It is unclear why any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of broadening the SEC's powers,
in light of the principles of statutory construction that argue for narrow
interpretation of doubtful grants of rulemaking authority.28 2
One problem with interpreting the SEC's power narrowly is the
limited value of this interpretation in determining the direction of fu-
ture regulation. The federal proxy regulations have been accepted with
little question for more than fifty years, and the development of both
state and federal systems to regulate the voting process has been pre-
mised upon the active involvement of the SEC. Even if the objection to
this involvement is well taken, it likely comes too late.
Because the text of Section 14(a) does not contain explicit guidance
as to the limitations of the SEC's rulemaking authority, and the legisla-
tive history does not resolve the issue, the question of interpretation
remains. By focusing the inquiry on whether the SEC has the authority
to enact substantive regulation, previous discussion has masked a more
critical line of analysis. Even if the SEC has the power to enact sub-
stantive regulations, it is not clear that the existing regulatory system is
consistent with congressional direction about the role of proxy regula-
tion in the shareholder-management relationship. In other words, does
the legislative history reveal a congressional theory of shareholder par-
ticipation in corporate governance and, if so, are the proxy rules consis-
tent with that theory?
The preceding historical analysis can inform this inquiry. To con-
clude that the legislative history does not furnish a solution to the ques-
tion of whether Congress intended proxy regulation to extend beyond
280. Thel, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 415-16 (cited in note 43).
281. The ambiguity of legislative history is one reason many commentators, most notably
Justice Scalia, criticize judicial reliance on legislative history as a means of statutory interpreta-
tion. See, for example, FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J.) (stating that even the "best legislative history" is but one "clue as to what the legislat-
ing 'party' had in mind").
282. See, for example, Homer Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation In
Search of a Purpose 28 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979) (criticizing the SEC for "elaboration of
its proxy rules to affect corporate governance" and describing those rules as "a frolic and detour
for which it has no specific statutory authority and very dubious implied authority") (emphasis
added).
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disclosure does not render its examination irrelevant for evaluating the
legitimacy of the proxy rules. Although previous analyses have stopped
with the determination of whether Congress intended to authorize sub-
stantive regulation, the legislative history provides further guidance.
With respect to the first question, the legislative history provides
some indications of a congressional theory of corporate governance.
During the development of the statute, Congress focused on the abuses
perpetrated by corporate insiders, not merely in connection with securi-
ties transactions, but in connection with misuse of the proxy machinery.
Moreover, the record reveals a congressional desire to increase share-
holder information and participation. This intention is significant be-
cause it is decidedly non-neutral. Although the Fletcher Report, for
example, recognizes that the proxy process may be misused by both
corporate insiders and by third parties,2 8 no indication is given in the
Fletcher Report or elsewhere that Congress was concerned about the
effects of too much participation by shareholders in corporate
decisionmaking.
This interpretation is consistent with the general objective of the
federal regulatory scheme: protection of investors.284 The federal securi-
ties laws were drafted in response to abuses against investors and share-
holders. Congress initially did not attempt to render the corporate
governance structure more efficient; reform the model of corporate deci-
sionmaking; or determine the social, moral, or political role of the firm
in society. Congress instead focused on fair corporate suffrage, recogniz-
ing that management interference with the voting process was depriving
shareholders of their rightful voice in the management of their corpora-
tions and aggravating the effects of the Berle-Means separation of own-
ership and control.
In this light, fair corporate suffrage includes not simply the in-
formed exercise of voting rights, but the unrestrained exercise of those
rights. As the Rayburn Report explained, "[T]he proposed bill gives the
[Commission] power to control the conditions under which proxies may
283. Fletcher Report at 77 (cited in note 235). The Report stated:
It is contemplated that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission will protect
investors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies, on the one hand, by irresponsible
outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away from honest and conscientious corpo-
ration officials; and, on the other hand, by unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to retain
control of the management by concealing and distorting facts. The rules and regulations will
also render it impossible for brokers having no beneficial ownership interest in a security to
usurp the franchise power of their customers and thereby deprive the latter of their voice in
the control of the corporations in which they hold securities.
Id.
284. Even those who argue that legislative history is an inappropriate method of statutory
interpretation recognize the legitimacy of looking to the structure and purpose of the statute as a
whole for interpretive guidance. See Zeppos, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1296 (cited in note 10).
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be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which
have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders." 5
The abuses to which the Report refers involve management misuse of
the proxy machinery for selfish ends.
Congress modified the language of Section 14(a) during the draft-
ing process to reflect this concern more clearly. Early versions of the bill
authorized the Commission to promulgate such regulations as were nec-
essary or appropriate "in the interest of the issuer of such security or
for the protection of investors in the securities of such issuer.'"2 6 The
final statute deleted the reference to the interests of the issuer. Con-
gress instead authorized the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations
"in the public interest or for the protection of investors. '2 87 The proxy
provision thus evolved with an increased focus on protecting sharehold-
ers' voting rights. Removing the reference to the issuer may have re-
flected congressional recognition that it was precisely those who speak
for the issuer that jeopardize shareholder rights. If Congress was con-
cerned about protecting shareholders from abuses that were practiced
by insiders in the name of the corporation, then the direction to the
SEC should focus on protecting the interests of these investors, not the
interests of the issuer that might be defended by corporate insiders as
conflicting with those of the individual shareholders.
Contemporaneous views of the public corporation supplement the
legislative history of the Exchange Act. Many people in the United
States in the early 1900s were concerned about corporate power and
corporate accountability.2 88 The history of the corporate democracy
movement indicates that shareholder activism was viewed as a means of
limiting the power of corporate management.289 This movement has
been described as an effort "to make the corporation accountable to
shareholders through the development of specific legal mechanisms that
would give outside, nonmanagement groups more direct power in corpo-
rate affairs. '290 Empowering the shareholders diffused the concentration
of power and monitored management's exercise of it. To the extent that
285. Rayburn Report at 13 (cited in note 242).
286. For example, H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 25, 1934) (emphasis added).
287. Section 14(a) (cited in note 46).
288. See, for example, Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (reviewing the historical distrust of the corporate form and its attendant aggregations of capi-
tal and power). See also Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (cited
in note 31); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 1365 (1932); William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 (1934)
(calling for an independent organization to monitor management and to redress problems of absen-
tee ownership).
289. Pound, 29 J. Fin. Econ. at 245-46 (cited in note 271).
290. Id. at 246.
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Congress held these concerns in 1934,291 a broad delegation of authority
to the SEC to address abuses of corporate power through proxy regula-
tion offered a partial response. 92
C. Proxy Regulation and Federalism
The foregoing review suggests that the prevailing view in Congress
at the time the federal securities laws were passed was that corporate
insiders had too much power and were misusing this power at the ex-
pense of shareholders. The question this review does not answer con-
cerns the extent to which Congress intended the federal securities laws
to provide a substantive remedy to this problem.9 3 One additional fac-
tor should be considered in determining whether proxy regulation is the
appropriate remedy: the role of the federal securities laws in the feder-
alist structure of corporate regulation.29'
The relationship of the proxy rules to state law is frequently over-
looked. Although the proxy rules do not preempt state corporation law,
the two regulatory systems rest upon very different organizing princi-
ples. Corporate law varies from state to state, and for the most part, the
organization and internal affairs of a corporation are subject only to the
law of its state of incorporation. Additionally, corporate law is primarily
enabling rather than mandatory.295 Many statutes allow corporations to
choose the extent to which the corporation will be subject to the "de-
291. See, for example, Comment, 33 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 915 (cited in note 28) (viewing federal
regulation as an effort to "re-establish" shareholder democracy, particularly through the SEC's
supervision of the proxy solicitation process, which will enable "significant blocks of voters ... to
canalize corporate policy by well-directed opposition").
292. See Roosevelt v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(stating that" '[i]t is obvious to the point of banality... that Congress intended by its enactment
of section 14 ... to give true vitality to the concept of corporate democracy' ") (quoting Medical
Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
293. It is in making this connection that Professor Ryan's work is most clearly deficient. See
Ryan, 23 Ga. L. Rev. at 146 (cited in note 6) (concluding that the legislative history shows Con-
gress understood that the proposed proxy regulation power would "work significant changes in
management-shareholder relationships").
294. Interpretive theory might deem this an evolutionist approach, reasoning that under-
standing of a statute may evolve to meet "new problems and societal circumstances." See William
N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan.
L. Rev. 321, 378 (1990) (arguing that "[t]he history that should drive statutory interpretation is
not just the original expectations surrounding the statute, but also the ongoing historical develop-
ment of the statute as those historical expectations and policies are applied in new and unantici-
pated factual settings").
295. The statutes take different forms, but the general approach allows corporate constituen-
cies, through the contractual provisions of the corporate charter, to adopt governance mechanisms
that differ from traditional rules. For a detailed discussion of the merits of establishing corporate
governance through enabling legislation and the contractual mechanism of the charter, see Sympo-
sium, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 (1989).
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fault" rules of the governing statute through charter provisions modify-
ing those rules.29 6
Federal law, on the other hand, applies to publicly held corpora-
tions wherever located, subject to certain thresholds on size, number of
shareholders, or Exchange listing.297 The federal regulations are
mandatory; firms cannot, for example, adopt charter provisions exempt-
ing them from the federal proxy rules. Finally, federal law is adminis-
tered through the SEC, a specialized agency that brings unique
experience and perspective to the regulatory process.
Regulation of corporate issues is effected primarily by one system
or the other. Federal law, for example, is the dominant force in the reg-
ulation of insider trading, the issuance of new securities, and periodic
disclosure by corporations. State law supplies the rules governing direc-
tors' duties to their shareholders, the payment of dividends, and the
shareholder's right to inspect corporate books and records and share-
holder lists. In the area of shareholder voting, however, federal and
state laws are highly interdependent because of the development of the
proxy voting process. For more than fifty years, during which time the
modern public corporation has undergone a substantial transformation
in size, range of business, and role in society, both state and federal law
have regulated shareholder voting.
The interdependence of the state and federal regulatory systems
has several consequences. First, the mere existence of the federal proxy
rules may have restrained the development of state corporation law in
the area of voting regulation. A state statute that conflicted with the
proxy rules might not be valid under the Supremacy Clause. Addition-
ally, the federal rules subdue state motivation to legislate. State legisla-
tures have become accustomed to leaving the regulation of the voting
process to the SEC and defer to that agency's expertise. State and fed-
eral courts also have grown accustomed to viewing shareholder proxy
rights as those rights defined by the SEC rules. In spite of the SEC's
statements that its rules simply enable shareholders to realize state law
rights, courts are loathe to recognize ballot access, information, or pro-
296. Considering a corporation's selection of governance charter provisions a "choice"
presumes an effective voting process. The corporate charter cannot be viewed as a contract be-
tween shareholders and management, however, unless shareholders are able to introduce value-
increasing charter amendments and resist management efforts to enact value-decreasing
amendments.
297. See Section 14(a) (cited in note 46) (applying federal proxy rules to solicitations in re-
spect of any security registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). A few provi-
sions of the statute even apply to privately held corporations, such as the antifraud provision of
Rule 10b-5.
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cedural rights that extend beyond those explicitly guaranteed by fed-
eral law." 8
Federal law further constrains experimentation by individual cor-
porations. Because the proxy rules do not contain an opting-out mecha-
nism, a corporation cannot determine how to conduct its proxy
solicitation process through charter provisions. Accordingly, the proxy
rules affirmatively preclude corporations from choosing the third alter-
native of the SEC's 1980 Corporate Governance proposal-making their
own decisions on the voting process and ballot access. Although the lab-
oratory of the individual corporate charter may be an ideal place for
experimentation in shareholder democracy, such experimentation is se-
verely curtailed by the requirements and procedures imposed on voting
by federal law.
At the same time, the existence of state corporation law has served
as a restraint, and perhaps an excuse, limiting the scope of the SEC's
rulemaking. The Business Roundtable decision illustrates the judicial
response to SEC interference with the voting process;2 9  the decision is
premised on the view that the regulation of voting has traditionally
298. Courts frequently evaluate shareholder rights to ballot access solely in terms of the ac-
cess mandated by Rule 14a-8. See, for example, Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205 (6th Cir.
1984) (resolving a shareholder suit to compel inclusion of a shareholder proposal by finding that
the proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(8)). Accord Grimes v. Centerior Energy Corp.,
909 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Austin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 788 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). These decisions imply that shareholders have no right to access except that afforded by the
Rule. Indeed, Grimes argued that Centerior's proxy materials were rendered misleading by omit-
ting mention of the fact that Grimes would offer a major proposal at the shareholders' meeting.
Grimes, 909 F.2d at 533. The court rejected this argument by concluding that Rule 14a-8(c) served
to "define" proper subjects for shareholder action "under applicable state law." Id. Therefore, the
court concluded that the issuer could not be required even to mention the proposal. Id.
299. The chilling effect of state corporate law on the SEC's proxy rules extends beyond regu-
lation of the voting process. Apart from disclosure, the SEC has imposed no substantive restric-
tions on management conduct in connection with a proxy solicitation. For example, the SEC has
not imposed any fiduciary standard on the exercise of management's obligations under the federal
proxy rules. Thus, management can and does interfere with shareholder democracy by objecting to
the inclusion of shareholder proposals, preparing proxy materials that recommend a vote against
proposals the company is forced to include, and opposing shareholder solicitations. See Emerson
and Latcham, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 816-17 (cited in note 70) (observing that although" 'a powerful
case can be made for management support of proposals to extend cumulative voting,' they were
invariably opposed by management") (quoting Charles M. Williams, Cumulative Voting For Di-
rectors 184 (Harvard U., 1951)). Management also may vote its own stock and the stock it controls,
such as stock in employee stock option plans or company pension plans, against shareholder initia-
tives. In the absence of federally imposed standards on management conduct, shareholders have
little opportunity to challenge it, regardless of whether management is acting in the best interests
of the corporation. Although management's opposition to a shareholder proposal may be improper,
management's actions generally will be protected by the business judgment rule and, therefore,
immune from legal challenge in a state law derivative suit premised upon management's breach of
fiduciary duty. Compare United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190 (2d
Cir. 1993) (finding that management's response to a shareholder proposal violated federal rules
against false and misleading statements).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1129
been relegated to state law. SEC rules that provide for direct nomina-
tion of directors, allow shareholders to initiate charter amendments, or
require shareholder ratification for the adoption of management-driven
corporate law reforms such as anti-takeover legislation are likely to gen-
erate a similar response.300 Critics have even attacked proposed proxy
rules imposing confidential voting requirements or a federal right of ac-
cess to shareholder lists as improper intrusions into the traditional pur-
view of state law. 01
VII. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The interdependence of federal and state regulation of shareholder
voting plays an important role in a pragmatic or dynamic approach to
interpreting the scope of delegation under Section 14(a) within which
the SEC's proper actions must be evaluated. 2  Under modern theories
of statutory interpretation-theories that previously have not been em-
ployed to examine securities regulation-one must consider the current
social and political framework of shareholder voting to ascertain the ap-
propriate role of the federal proxy rules.
The problem with the status quo system of regulation is that share-
holder voting currently is neither fair nor effective.303 Although voting
300. This regulation would be the equivalent of a federally-imposed "opting-in" requirement.
301. See, for example, Letter from American Bar Association to Jonathan G. Katz 8 (Sept.
23, 1991) (stating that "we do not believe that [the SEC's rulemaking authority] extends to feder-
alizing the existing body of state law with respect to the right of access to a securityholder list");
Comments of the Business Roundtable on Exchange Act Release No. 29,315 at 7 (Sept. 18, 1991)
(observing that the shareholder list proposal "would inappropriately intrude into state regulation
of corporate governance"). See also Shareholder Communication Proposals Produce Second Tidal
Wave of Comments, 24 Fed. Sec. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1516, 1518 (Sept. 25, 1992) (describing the
American Bar Association's opposition to a proposed amendment prohibiting bundling of issues on
the basis that it impermissibly interfered with state law, under which directors were entitled to
group proposals as they deemed appropriate).
302. This characterization is based on the work of William Eskridge and Philip Frickey in
conceptualizing a dynamic theory of statutory interpretation. See, for example, Eskridge, 135 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (cited in note 14) ; Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (cited in note 294).
Their approach has been described as not simply pragmatic in the practical sense, but "in the
postmodern epistemological sense of recognizing that answers vary according to context and per-
spective and are at bottom social constructions." Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern
Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2505, 2591 (1992)
(footnote omitted). A detailed discussion of dynamic statutory interpretation is, however, beyond
the scope of this Article.
303. Studies showing that shareholders vote to approve management-sponsored proposals,
even when those proposals are value-decreasing, demonstrate the problems with the shareholder
voting process. See, for example, Gregg A. Jarrell and Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and
Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. Fin. Econ. 127, 141-54
(1987) (examining shareholder approval of value-decreasing anti-takeover charter amendments);
Gordon, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 193) (demonstrating that shareholders approve dual class
common recapitalizations even though empirical evidence shows they significantly decrease share-
holder wealth).
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is the primary tool by which shareholders participate in corporate gov-
ernance, shareholder voting does not work properly for reasons that in-
clude: (1) the separation of ownership and control;304 (2) management
domination of the proxy mechanism;3°5 and (3) collective action
problems in shareholder voting.306
The implications of these shortcomings are substantial. Economic
theories of corporate governance justify differences in state corporation
law on the theory that these differences provide healthy competition.3 0 7
A corporation can choose the law that allows it to operate most effi-
ciently.308 If, however, shareholders do not have sufficient power
through the voting process to participate in meaningful bargaining, the
market will not operate to produce the best corporate decisions.
Thus, if shareholder voting does not reflect an accurate and in-
formed expression of shareholder opinion, business decisions such as
choosing management, selecting a new state of incorporation, engaging
in a merger, or opting into an anti-takeover statute can be made in cir-
cumstances under which they are not value-increasing.3 0 9 Moreover,
304. For example, Berle and Means argue that because corporations are controlled not by
their owners but by management, management control of the proxy process frustrates sharehold-
ers' only means of exercising power. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty at 246 (cited in note 31).
305. Other than shareholder proposals initiated under Rule 14a-8, management selects the
issues submitted to the shareholders, including nomination of directors, initiation of charter
amendments, and selection of auditors. Even when shareholders can propose issues, board ap-
proval is still required. See, for example, Cal. Corp. Code § 902(a) (West, 1990) (allowing share-
holders to initiate a charter amendment but requiring board approval).
Management also may engage in strategic behavior, such as linking difficult proposals to a
"sweetener" or promising shareholders a benefit if they approve a management proposal. See
Gordon, 76 Cal. L. Rev. at 29-60 (cited in note 193) (describing management's strategic behavior to
affect voting by such means as bundling wealth-reducing proposals with "sweeteners," playing
chicken, using coercive tactics, and directly pressuring institutional investors). Management's use
of such tactics clearly limits the ability of shareholder voting to reflect rational and informed
shareholder choice. The new amendments address the issue of bundling by prohibiting linking of
matters for shareholder vote. See notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
306. See note 12.
307. See, for example, Winter, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (cited in note 41); Frank H. Easterbrook
and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 (1989); Roberta Romano,
Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lessons of Takeover Statutes, 61 Fordham L. Rev.
843, 844 (1993).
308. See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate
Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1703, 1704-08 (1989) (describing the economic basis of the contractual
theory of the firm).
309. Recent literature in the area of takeover legislation illustrates these principles. States
have experimented with different regulatory structures governing takeovers, and corporations,
through reincorporation and opt-in or opt-out provisions, have been able to choose the regulatory
regime in which to operate.
Although empirical evidence demonstrates a negative correlation between anti-takeover stat-
utes and shareholder returns, adoption of such statutes is widespread. See Romano, 61 Fordham L.
Rev. at 850-51 (1993) (cited in note 307). This negative correlation seems inconsistent with the
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limitations on shareholder access to the proxy process prevent share-
holders from initiating value-increasing changes in the governance
structure of their corporation.3 10 The market, which is expected to pro-
duce efficient business decisions, thereby fails.
Perhaps this market failure motivated congressional regulation of
the proxy process. 3 11 Although Congress did not provide a definition of
"fair corporate suffrage," this term may define a voting process in
which shareholders are able to voice their concerns and objectives, com-
municate them to fellow shareholders, and implement them in corpo-
rate decisions. A dynamic interpretation of Section 14(a) considers the
evolution of federal regulation of voting within the context of the mod-
ern corporation. The preceding discussion of legislative history suggests
that this model of shareholder participation in corporate decisionmak-
ing fairly achieves the congressional objectives articulated in 1934.
In particular, although the model supports a theory of regulation
that extends beyond disclosure and operates substantively to empower
shareholders at the expense of management, the theory is not inconsis-
tent with congressional intent to steer clear of corporate internal affairs.
State law can be relied upon to regulate corporate governance without
generating a race to the bottom, as long as the choice of governance
structures by shareholders is a real choice. Viewed in this light, sub-
stantive regulation of the proxy process does not preempt the operation
of state corporate law, but rather enhances it.
This enhancement provides both a basis for evaluating the legiti-
macy of the SEC's proxy regulations and a blueprint for future regula-
tory activity. The foregoing suggests that, based on Congress's concern
view that corporations will choose the anti-takeover rule that maximizes their value, and, if a state
adopts a damaging statute, will opt out of the statute either by reincorporating in a state that does
not have anti-takeover laws or by adopting a statutorily-provided exclusion. Deficiencies in the
voting process that frustrate shareholder choice may explain the inconsistency. If, for example, a
state adopted an anti-takeover statute with an opt-out provision, corporations that would be dam-
aged by the statute would have to achieve an opting-out charter amendment by shareholder
vote-a considerable hurdle given management control of ballot access and the voting process. See
id. (describing barriers imposed by the proxy mechanism on shareholder choice regarding anti-
takeover legislation).
310. For example, a corporation's ability to select favorable state law charter provisions is
limited in many states because charter amendments can be proposed only by management. See, for
example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 242(b)(1) (requiring the board of directors to adopt a resolution
proposing the amendment and then submit the issue for shareholder vote in order to amend the
corporate charter). Shareholders thus are unable to initiate a charter amendment directly.
311. The ineffectiveness of shareholder voting as a check against value-decreasing changes in
the corporate structure was identified as a problem as early as the 1930s. See, for example, Note,
Corporate Recapitalization by Charter Amendment, 46 Yale L. J. 985 (1937) (describing unfair
recapitalizations accomplished through charter amendments in which preferred shareholders, al-
though gaining little and losing much, nonetheless voted in favor of the plans). The commentator
observed that the problem might be attributed to inadequacies of the proxy system. Id. at 999.
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with insider abuse, Congress intended to authorize the SEC to remove
the barriers erected by management to shareholder participation in cor-
porate governance. SEC rules designed to enhance shareholder partici-
pation, such as allowing shareholders access to the proxy mechanism, or
to facilitate the ability of shareholders to communicate with each other
thus are legitimate. Rules that curtail shareholder participation by lim-
iting the number of proposals a shareholder can make, preventing
shareholders from communicating freely or acting in concert to effect a
change in corporate governance, or providing management the ability to
control the voting agenda are not. Furthermore, the SEC has not been
empowered to adopt a general theory of corporate governance. The SEC
has neither the expertise nor the authorization to decide if corporations
should respond to social policy concerns, or if shareholder-initiated pro-
posals will unduly interfere with management discretion. Congress has
reserved precisely those issues for state law.
This analysis also demonstrates that the SEC's progress in pursuit
of fair corporate suffrage has been deficient. Regulation 14A, even with
the SEC's recent amendments, does not go far enough in resolving the
problems associated with the voting process. The SEC rules do not
overcome management control of the agenda. Although the SEC has
given shareholders an affirmative right to access the ballot through Rule
14a-8, this right is limited to a restricted class of primarily nonbinding,
advisory proposals on corporate policy.3 12 In addition, the SEC has oth-
erwise burdened ballot access through restrictions on subject matter,"'
minimum stockholdings and holding periods, and limitations on the
number of issues a shareholder can raise.
This analysis does not espouse increased use of the shareholder
proposal process or defend the use of such proposals in the social-politi-
cal area. It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the merits of
shareholder activism; yet if courts, commentators, and even institu-
tional investors314 cannot agree which subjects are appropriate for
shareholder voice, the SEC has neither the ability nor the right to make
312. The theory that shareholder proposals are improper if they interfere with management's
role under state law directly counters the congressional view of the voting process as a means to
reduce management dominance and to enable shareholders to participate in decisionmaking.
313. As has been described, two of the areas that the SEC has decided are inappropriate for
shareholder action are payment of dividends and executive compensation. Writing in 1934, at the
same time Congress passed the Exchange Act, commentators Benjamin Graham and David L.
Dodd included these topics among those to which the shareholders' attention should be particu-
larly focused because of the inherent conflict between the interests of shareholders and manage-
ment. Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd, Securities Analysis 510-11 (McGraw-Hill, 1934).
314. See, for example, Comments of Sarah Teslick, Executive Director of Institutional Share-
holder Services, 1 Corp. Governance Advisor 5 (1993) (indicating dissatisfaction of private institu-
tional investors with the use of shareholder proposals for non-monetary issues).
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that decision. With the growing participation of institutional investors
in corporate governance, the market is likely to select an efficient de-
gree of shareholder democracy, absent SEC interference.815
Additionally, the SEC rules do not resolve collective action
problems associated with the voting process; in fact, the rules aggravate
these problems. Although the recent amendments eliminating the filing
requirement for certain proxy solicitations address one particularly
egregious s16 burden on shareholders who wish to act collectively, the
amendments do not exempt institutional investors or investors seeking
board representation-two classes of shareholders most likely to par-
ticipate actively in corporate democracy. 17 Exempted shareholders who
succeed in reaching and mobilizing a large number of their colleagues
also may fall prey to the disclosure requirements of Section 13(d). 18
Moreover, recent amendments to two particularly problematic re-
straints on shareholder activity-"bundling" of proposals and the
"bona fide nominee" rule-do not reflect a commitment to removing
restraints on shareholder choice. Instead, these amendments reflect po-
litical compromise and offer more promise of shareholder confusion
than participation.
The extent to which the federal proxy rules frustrate shareholder
democracy has been chronicled extensively elsewhere.31 9 Many of these
315. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 26 J. L. & Econ. 395 (cited in note 6) (arguing that the
market will select the most efficient role for shareholder voting in corporate governance in the
absence of restrictive federal regulation).
316. During the hearings, one witness expressly argued that the filing requirements would
negatively affect shareholders who wish to participate in corporate governance, contrary to the
very purposes of the legislation. See Senate Hearings at 7711-14 (cited in note 221) (statement of
Mr. Untermyer):
It does not give [the stockholder] any chance at all. It does the contrary. It embarrasses him.
It requires him to make a whole lot of disclosures to the Commission before he can go and
approach his fellow stockholders and ask their authority to act.... [I]t acquaints the manage-
ment, too, and puts them on guard, so that the stockholders are much more embarrassed, and
then it requires certain disclosures and it seems to me that it puts every stockholder who
wants to protect his corporation and get a change of management in the position of a sort of a
striker.
317. See note 12 and sources cited therein (addressing the role of the institutional investor in
corporate democracy).
318. Section 13(d) requires shareholders who collectively own 5% or more of a company to
disclose agreements to engage in collective action on Schedule 13D. See Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at
542-45 (cited in note 12) (describing the impact of § 13(d) on collective shareholder action). In
addition to requiring disclosure, § 13(d) is frequently used as a litigation weapon by management.
See Marc P. Cherno and Sandra F. Coppola, Use of Litigation as a Takeover Defense, Presenta-
tion at the 1988 ALI-ABA Securities Litigation Program 5 (Apr. 28-29, 1988) (describing strategic
defensive use of § 13(d) litigation).
319. See, for example, Black, 17 J. Corp. L. at 58 (cited in note 6) (observing that the proxy
rules "undercut the Congressional intent, reflected in Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,
to preserve shareholder voting as a meaningful check on corporate managers"); Black, 89 Mich. L.
Rev. at 536-42 (cited in note 12) (describing obstacles to shareholder action created by the proxy
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issues were brought to the attention of the SEC by the CalPERS let-
ter,32 0 but the SEC chose not to address them. In spite of its continued
re-examination of the regulatory system and its never-ending series of
amendments, the SEC continues to limit shareholder participation in
corporate governance both through sins of commission and omission in
connection with its proxy rules. 21 Accordingly, the rules remain an un-
authorized and misbegotten regulatory endeavor.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the extent to
which federal law can improve the voting process, or whether share-
holder voting can or will improve monitoring and lead to higher produc-
tivity for U.S. corporations. Currently, however, fair corporate suffrage
remains a mere ideal. By supplanting state law regulation of the voting
process, the SEC has shouldered the responsibility for effecting fair cor-
porate suffrage. To date, it has not lived up to this obligation.
rules). See also Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. 10 (1991). See also Black, 17 J. Corp. L. 49 (describing the shortcomings remaining in spite of
proxy reform proposals, including the availability of Rule 14a-9 to chill proxy solications through
the threat of litigation). The rules have also been criticized because they allow management pre-
access to shareholder proposals and an opportunity to respond, but do not allow shareholders to
oppose management proposals except through the expense of a counter-solicitation, and because
they permit management to charge its solicitation expenses to the company, but require dissidents
to pay the costs of communicating with their fellow shareholders. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and
Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 Cal. L. Rev.
1071 (1990) (describing the legal rules governing allocation of expenses in proxy contests and the
resulting effects on the contests' frequency and success). Management also may contact sharehold-
ers directly and exert pressure on their voting. Although the recent amendments responded to
several of the concerns raised by CalPERS, they did not address any of these problems. See also
Frank D. Emerson and Franklin C. Latcham, Further Insight Into More Effective Stockholder
Participation: The Sparks- Withington Proxy Contest, 60 Yale L. J. 429 (1951) (illustrating the
failure of the proxy rules to operate even-handedly in connection with a control contest by describ-
ing abuses such as management offering shareholders inducements in exchange for their proxies,
engaging in pressure solicitations, and taking advantage of professional contacts with broker-deal-
ers, bankers, and other key players in a proxy contest).
320. See notes 172, 195-96 and accompanying text.
321. See, for example, Black, 17 J. Corp. L. at 53 (cited in note 6) (observing that "[i]f the
Commission is to be criticized, it should be for not doing enough to deregulate proxy solicitation
and level the playing field on access to shareholder lists") (emphasis in original).

